Joshua Poggianti / Jun 2025
Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas . Photo: Shutterstock
On 28 June 2024, the then Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was appointed by the European Council as the fourth High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). The double-hatted position, first established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, was designed by its makers to answer Kissinger’s famous question: “who do I call if I want to call Europe?” Ten years later, however, the United States Secretary of State would have likely called the new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen before the HR/VP.
Since 2019, the former German defence minister has achieved a significant extension of the foreign policy competences of the Commission, as well as consolidated her authority over its commissioners. Despite the institution’s global ambitions set out in von der Leyen’s ‘geopolitical Commission’, the HR/VP was nonetheless sidelined in its role as Vice-President. Kallas’ predecessor, Josep Borrell, was arguably the first to experience the limits of his position’s influence imposed by the current President. Compared with the previous Commission, Borrell was immediately lowered in the institutional hierarchy, relegated below three new Executive Vice-Presidents. As a simple Vice-President, the Spaniard’s relationship with von der Leyen was fraught and exacerbated by the individuals’ different cultures and political views. Their uncoordinated response to Hamas’ attack on 7 October 2023 was particularly telling of such divergences, and its potential damaging consequences on the European Union’s credibility as a strong international actor.
Under Borrell’s mandate, a new Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space was also created, sustaining existing ‘turf wars’ between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by the High Representative. The move concentrated unprecedented power in the hands of the supranational institution, in foreign policy matters traditionally guarded by Member States. Ursula von der Leyen’s newfound sense of legitimacy in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine further emboldened the President’s drive for control. By the time Kallas was appointed, the Estonian faced the institutional competition of two new actors for the external representation of the Union: Defence and Space Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Commissioner for the Mediterranean Dubravka Šuica. Along with the existing European Council and Commission Presidents, this multiplication of leadership figures in Brussels contributes to the weakening visibility of the HR/VP and the overall poor understanding of the EU, as often pointed out by eurosceptics throughout the EU.
Less than a year into her mandate, initial optimism for Kallas has gradually given way to growing frustration among Member States. Perceived as overstepping her position by some, the High Representative alienated many when replacing the popular and experienced Secretary General of the EEAS, Stefano Sannino. On Ukraine, Kallas’ real expertise, she failed to secure support for a military aid plan worth €40 billion, announced with no prior consultations and eventually downsized to only €5 billion. Even then, Member States stretched by tight national budgets have been dragging their feet to commit to the reduced sum.
Amid institutional tensions, leadership rivalries, and defensive Member States, Kaja Kallas has struggled to fulfil her role’s expectations associated with her qualifications. Far from a true European Union Foreign Affairs Minister, the HR/VP is too often overshadowed by Ursula von der Leyen. To safeguard the EU’s geopolitical relevance in today’s world, the role’s mandate must be reinforced within the Commission, and Kallas elevated to a First Vice-President. Regarding the Commission President, a clearer and more balanced division of tasks would ensure greater institutional coherence on the global stage. The credibility of European foreign policy is at stake.
