Ed Arnold and Richard Whitman / Jul 2024
Image: Shutterstock
The new UK government has been vocal about a new UK–EU relationship and ‘resetting’ with the continent after Brexit. This reset has started immediately with the Foreign Secretary travelling to Berlin – key to unlocking better UK-EU relations and the target for a new bilateral defence and security treaty - within the first 100 days.
EU leaders and officials have been both welcoming and non-committal on closer UK–EU cooperation. The EU has a range of existing formal agreements with third countries, and the UK is unique in not having such a relationship. They conform to similar templates, and none are bespoke (excepting the US) along the lines that the Labour Party wants. The UK’s capabilities and prominent role in European security should give weight to a distinct relationship. However, beyond rhetoric from the EU’s leadership, there appears to be a lack of imagination and an absence of political will to conceive of a future relationship that would deliver maximum value and mutual benefit.
The primary driver for Labour’s UK–EU pact seems political – drawing a clean break with the previous Conservative approach. However, this focus confuses means and ends. The purpose of any UK–EU cooperation should first and foremost be to deliver additional value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War. The previous Sunak-led government had already done some of the work by jettisoning some of the Brexit divisiveness and rhetoric such as ‘Global Britain’. This must be furthered to capitalise on the unity that support for Ukraine has fostered and to stress that the UK and EU are allied in a shared common purpose to strengthen European security.
London should also be prepared for a heavy dose of realism as to what a pact might deliver, regardless of its ambition, as value for both sides is not a given. The UK will inevitably experience frustrations as a partner of the EU, with different tempos in their respective policymaking machinery. As recent examples, the UK and EU have both embarked on counter-Houthi naval operations in the Red Sea and training for Ukrainian soldiers, but it took the EU a considerable time to agree on the structure for its own missions. In the interim, the UK made other arrangements – supporting the US in the former and choosing to establish its own Ukraine training mission, where the speed of implementation attracted the participation of Finland and Sweden – then EU but not NATO members – in advance of the establishment of the EU Training Mission. An agility disparity would likely persist even if a formal UK–EU agreement is reached.
The new UK government should focus on agreeing a ‘UK–EU Joint Declaration on defence and security’ as soon as practically possible to set a strong direction of travel. This would affirm the designation of each party as key allies who should engage in foreign, security and defence cooperation of a scale and scope that reflects their status. A UK–EU Declaration should prioritise substantive areas for cooperation, rather than institutional landmarks, as the key to a close relationship. It would also set out a roadmap for substantive areas of cooperation to form building blocks for a modernised relationship. If this could be agreed in the remainder of this year, the UK could then use its strong relationship with Poland - as it takes over the rotating EU Council Presidency from 1 January 2025 – to facilitate the substantive negotiations, also knowing the outcome of the US presidential election.
While Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated that shared interests can drive the UK and the EU to work closely together, there is a need for both sides to think long-term for the benefit of Europe. The Labour Government has acknowledged that a more coherent UK–EU relationship on foreign, security and defence policy would be beneficial, but it needs to make its ambitions more concrete. Thus far, the EU has not felt compelled to set out its own agenda for future security cooperation with the UK. Leadership changes in Brussels and London will allow for a stock-take of where cooperation might be enhanced. Moving quickly – especially in a climate in which US leadership may be in a state of flux – will be important, but ambitions for an enhanced relationship should privilege policy substance over a push for expansive formal agreements.
