Richard Corbett / Mar 2026
Victor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary. Photo: Shutterstock
What if the government of one Member State deliberately seeks to block or sabotage the Union? Some might say that we are already in such a scenario, or close to it, but it could get even worse.
A veto of a single national government can be deployed in all fields where EU decisions require unanimity in the Council, not least foreign and security policy, EU finances (its budgetary resources, the multiannual financial framework and any borrowing instruments), several issues in the field of justice and police cooperation (including operational police cooperation), the accession of new Member States, and the suspension of a Member State that becomes a dictatorship or violates the principles on which the Union is founded.
The current geo-strategic situation has dramatically illustrated the problem. If the EU is to have any credibility in world affairs, it cannot afford to have a situation where even issuing a joint statement, let alone approving aid to Ukraine, is vulnerable to the veto of a single member of the Council.
Up to now, four main ways to circumvent unanimity have been discussed: passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and a supplementary treaty among willing states.
They all have limits and vulnerabilities.
Passerelle clauses: Both the general “passerelle” clause[1], and the six specific “passerelle” clauses[2] that apply to particular policy areas, empower the European Council (or in some cases the Council of ministers) to replace unanimous voting in the Council with QMV on a particular subject. However, all such decisions can be vetoed by a single national government.
Enhanced Cooperation: a group of Member States that wish to establish deeper cooperation among themselves may do so within the framework of the EU. The treaty specifies[3] that such cooperation must be consistent with the objectives of the Union and be open to all Member States to join at any time. It is intended as a last resort, when the Council “has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, and provided that at least nine Member States participate in it”. In an enhanced cooperation, all members of the Council may participate in deliberations, but only members of the Council representing the Member States participating in it may take part in any votes. On the EP side, MEPs from all Member States can vote. Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation bind only participating Member States.
Enhanced cooperation has been used a handful of times.[4] On at least one occasion, the Member States that initially triggered enhanced cooperation have later been joined by another, after it was established.[5]
Any decision authorising enhanced cooperation must be adopted by the Council by QMV with the consent of the EP – but not in the field of CFSP, where a unanimous decision is required and a single government can block it.
Inside an enhanced cooperation, the Member States concerned may (although in practice this has up to now never been done) agree unanimously to transfer any matters requiring unanimity to the field of QMV among themselves[6]. But they cannot even do that for matters with military or defence implications.
Enhanced cooperation is better than deadlock. It can avoid paralysis. The very possibility of doing so can incentivise Member States to negotiate a compromise rather than be left out. But in the field of CFSP, it can only be done if there is unanimous agreement. And it of course cannot be done at all for dealing with a Member State that no longer respects the rule of law, let alone for the MFF or the accession of new Member States.
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): The treaty[7] specifies that Member States “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework”. This can be done by QMV, but subsequent decisions within that framework require unanimity among the Member States involved.
This gives rise to a potentially contradictory dynamic. A veto can be avoided by using QMV to establish PESCO on a particular matter, but subsequent decisions still require unanimity of those who have joined it. This could incentivise reluctant Member States to join it, so as to be able to block subsequent decisions at a later stage. If so, the Council may adopt a decision, by QMV, suspending the participation of the Member State concerned, but only if it can argue that the Member State “no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments”.
PESCO thus offers some scope to avoid vetoes in the defence field, albeit convoluted.
A separate treaty: Groups of Member States can sign treaties among themselves if these do not contradict the EU treaties. Such separate treaties can even involve and confer responsibilities on the EU institutions.
Such was the case with the 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (sometimes referred to as the “Fiscal Compact”). It was a separate treaty, signed at the time by all but two Member States, to circumvent a British veto. It involved deepening commitments in a field that was already of EU competence.
Could this be done in the area of foreign and security policy? Yes, for those matters that are strictly CFSP, but not for things that are a matter of EU law such as trade sanctions or financial assistance from the EU budget. It could be a vehicle for taking common foreign policy positions and following them up with action on the security and defence front. It cannot help on matters such as overcoming vetoes on the MFF, EU enlargement, or dealing with a rogue Member State that becomes a dictatorship or violates the rule of law.
The ultimate fall-back
Notwithstanding the possibilities afforded by the mechanisms described above, the EU would remain paralysed in several respects if a Member State goes completely rogue and deliberately seeks to block or sabotage the Union. In such a scenario, the EU faces an existential crisis, with no easy way to circumvent it.
What could be done? One radical but feasible solution would be to draft a Treaty for a New Union, with identical articles and wording to the current ones, except on the points to be reformed, notably on replacing the veto with QMV (or perhaps a super-QMV with a higher threshold, but one which makes it impossible for, say, four or fewer Member States to block). It would have a clause whereby it takes on board for itself the entirety of the acquis communautaire – all the existing legislation, commitments, agreements, court judgements, etc of the old Union, and it would be ready to re-appoint the former employees and mandataires of the old Union. Those Member States that want to would sign it, and announce that they were ready to leave the old Union by invoking Article 50.
This is a far-fetched scenario at present, but not inconceivable if a situation were to arise where one or two Member States block decisions, oppose any reform, refuse to follow existing EU rules, and continue to backslide on the rule of law and democracy.
The very act of preparing such a treaty would incentivise those in the minority to compromise rather than be excluded. And, if they refuse to compromise, proceeding without them might result in them catching up later. After all, both these scenarios have been seen before in the history of European integration.
Back in 1950, when the Council of Europe had just been established (at the time, a pioneering innovation bringing together European countries for the first time in a common framework with a Committee of Ministers and a Parliamentary Assembly), early attempts to deepen it were blocked by Britain and the Nordic countries. This deadlock was only overcome by a separate initiative of just 6 (of its then 12) Member States who signed a separate treaty, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) treaty, reflecting Paul Henri Spaak’s invitation to faire l’Europe avec ceux qui veulent faire l’Europe. In due course, most of the others joined them, but if they had not forced the issue, deadlock would have continued.
Later, in 1984, after a period that was called Eurosclerosis, the first elected European Parliament drew up a proposed “Draft Treaty establishing the European Union” (often referred to as the Spinelli draft treaty, after Parliament’s rapporteur) and invited those Member States that wanted to, to sign – even if it wasn’t all of them. This gave rise to a debate about proceeding with deeper integration without all Member States. If not all of them joined, there would be a double structure of a new Union existing alongside the then European Community, but there would be no doubt which would be the stronger structure. The old Community would wither. The reluctant states would either eventually join the new Union, or negotiate an Association Agreement with it, rather than insist on maintaining a moribund Community. The fact that the new Union would take over the entirety of the aquis was an essential part of this equation.
French President Francois Mitterrand hinted that he supported this idea, as did several national parliaments. The 1985 European Council in Milan took an unprecedented majority vote to convene a treaty-drafting Inter-Governmental Conference, against the opposition of Denmark, Greece, and the UK. Those three eventually decided to join the negotiations rather than be left out. This resulted in the Single European Act, the first general revision of the treaties since the Treaty of Rome. The threat of moving ahead without all was a crucial ingredient of this dynamic.
Now is perhaps the time to again put on the table the possibility of a new treaty without the blocking states. Not to do so means accepting EU paralysis in many fields and the inability to do anything about non-democratic Member States, or those who become agents of hostile powers.
[1] Art 48(7) TEU
[2] Art 31 TEU and Arts 81, 153, 192, 312, and 333 TFEU
[3] Article 20 TEU
[4] The establishment of the European Prosecutor’s Office, Unitary Patent protection, some aspects of family law, and most recently on the Ukrainian Support Loan
[5] Italy, regarding the Unitary Patent
[6] Art 333 TFEU
[7] Articles 42(4) and 46 TEU and Protocol No10
