Welcome to a pluripolar world

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In this age of upheaval and global transition, Europe should prepare for a pluripolar world. Although harder to manage, rather than being squeezed by the US and China, the European Union may be better off in an external environment of multiple actors, shifting alliances, different policy domains, and levers of power. Yet, in this new context, anticipation, coordination, unity, and common strategic direction will be as critical and as hard to achieve because of political fragmentation within and outside the EU.

Pluripolarity: What is it?

Pluripolarity will be the name of the coming geopolitical games. After the ‘Concert of Europe,’ followed by the multipolar interwar period, the Cold War that divided the world in almost two camps – resisted by India’s non-aligned movement and China’s growing ideological autonomy and split from the Soviet Union – and the brief unipolar moment of US primacy in the 1990s, Europe and the world need to adjust to a shifting order where poles are defined by the command of different levers of power, influence, and policy domains – economic, social, political, military, technological, educational, cultural, and ideational.

In a pluripolar order, multipolarity, bipolarity and, even, elements of unipolarity can coexist. For example: In nuclear power terms, the world is largely bipolar – Russia and the US; on trade, the world is clearly multipolar with some leading poles such as the EU, China or the US, but there are several more trading powerhouses; on AI, the trends point to a bipolarization between the US and China, with predominance to the Americans. If one combines all levers of power, the US is likely to still be at the top of the ranking.

Besides nation states, other actors play a role in a pluripolar system. From tech platforms and firms, global corporations, and individuals like Elon Musk to non-state actors such as terrorist groups or organised crime, there are many forces shaping and influencing geopolitics today. The international system is therefore more complex, dynamic, and fluid.

Resisting rivalry; hedging bifurcation 

A central characteristic of this emerging pluripolar system is that it rejects or resists the centralising pull from the two current predominant rival powers in the world: The United States and China. It is less about the West versus the Rest and more about the rejection of a Pax Sino-Americana imposed from above.

Pluripolarity also manifests because the dominant poles are unwilling or incapable to unilaterally coerce others effectively. While the US may still be the preeminent country in the world, the costs of imposing its will by force on others would likely outweigh the benefits except when responding to existential threats or dealing with significantly weaker adversaries.

The intervention in Iran and the crisis that followed in the Strait of Hormuz are a case in point. Could the US have used additional force? Yes. But at what cost and with which results? Russia has been waging a war of aggression on Ukraine for more than four years and is nowhere near its strategic aims. China seems willing to wait and take Taiwan with the least possible cost. So, there are limits to Great Powers’s power.

These limits are likely to continue being tested during  the Trump 2.0 interventionist presidency. The US power potential is unmatched in most areas, but it is unclear whether there is willingness to use it fully and in what terms. Time will tell. 

Middle powers

Potential bifurcation and pluripolarity also mean that those not at the top are nonetheless able to hedge and find room for manoeuvre. This creates leverage for the array of actors or poles that seek more strategic autonomy and develop policies shaped by their values, national interests, and levers of power.

Today, there is a host of countries – Prime Minister Carney’s ‘Middle Powers’ – that range from Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia or the UK, but could also include Singapore, that not only do not want to pick sides, but rather prefer to cooperate with both superpowers and want to be sovereign in their other international relations, increasing their freedom. Yet, this may come at a cost too.

Paradoxes of anarchy

The pluripolar order is potentially more anarchic and boundless than a bipolar or unipolar system also allowing all types of political regimes to coexist either by balancing or bandwagoning. By forming ‘coalitions of the willing,’ setting alliances, or establishing mutually beneficial transactions or deals, countries can increase their influence or, at least, have more choices regarding their global engagements. 

However, this ‘freedom’ comes with at least two downside risks in a pluripolar international order: First, authoritarians may be able to endure more easily because they have a freer hand to impose their will, domestically and globally. Second, in this state of increasing anarchy, war and conflict become bigger threats as they can be waged with fewer shackles than before. 

What it means for the EU?

A pluripolar order, although much more complex and volatile, given the number of actors and shifting interests, can be an opportunity for the European Union to assert itself globally and promote new forms of multilateralism, especially at a time when the universal norms that kept peace and stability are increasingly disputed, even by those who created them.

In this context, how can the EU fare as a unique multilateral-supranational organisation?

The EU’s long life means that it has had to adapt to, influence, and endure different international orders. While it has mostly thrived under different global arrangements, also benefiting from a long and generous peace dividend provided by NATO and the US security umbrella, the benefits of that heyday stability are now gradually closing.

The future calling

To be successful in the long-term, Brussels and the twenty-seven will need to adjust to and shape this emerging global order. European integration will be at stake if the European Union ends up mirroring the current global instability. A fragmented and disunited EU, unable to strengthen its economic model, beef-up its security and defence, enlarge its geostrategic influence by bringing in countries like Ukraine, and boost its societal resilience and preparedness, will be at the mercy of others in a pluripolar order.

The future is calling – may there be courage and imagination to answer it.

 

A Portuguese version of this article appeared on 19 June in Sábado:  https://www.sabado.pt/opiniao/convidados/ricardo-borges-de-castro/detalhe/bem-vindos-ao-mundo-pluripolar .