Simon Taylor / Sep 2024
Photo: European Union, 2024
First, let me start by praising La Matinale Européenne, a daily newsletter on EU politics, written by two former Brussels correspondents; one from AFP and one from Radio Radicale. It is by far the best newsletter on the EU and the only one I make a point of reading every morning.
While I don’t agree with every aspect of their analysis (they tend to be very French focused and anti-competition), most of what they write is perceptive. I will not mention the frankly pathetic competition they face in the Brussels newsletter market.
Their piece 18 September on VDL II or 2.0, however you want to call it, was extremely helpful to try to understand how decisions will be taken over the next five years.
I think the clear winners (apart from von der Leyen’s political family, the EPP) are Ukraine and the European right’s position on migration and economics.
With former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as High Rep, Poland’s Piotr Serafin as budgets Commissioner (in charge of drafting the next EU multi-annual budget) and Lithuanian Andris Kubilius in charge of the defence portfolio, Ukraine can be sure that the Commission is staffed by the strongest possible advocates of giving it both the funds and the equipment it needs to rebuild and protect itself over the next mandate. With the Slovene Marta Kos in charge of enlargement, Ukraine (plus Moldova) can expect to make good progress towards EU membership over the next five years, even if the ultimate goal of joining the Union is probably a decade away. How much money and arms the Ukrainians get will depend on national capitals but there will be the strongest possible push from the Berlaymont.
The other winner is the right’s stance on migration. I say “the right” because there is a clear convergence of the positions of the centre-right of von der Leyen’s EPP and the national conservatives represented by Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni and the ECR. There will be a tougher policy towards illegal immigrants (which is already enshrined in the EU’s Migration Pact) with more processing of applications outside the EU. Putting another EPP figure, the until now invisible Croat Dubravka Šuica, in charge of relations with the Mediterranean is a sure sign of VDL’s priorities, which, to be clear, are those of the majority of EU member states (including, let’s not forget, the Danish Social Democrats and, so it seems, the UK).
A few other interesting points to highlight: a lot has been written about Meloni’s man, Raffaele Fitto, being executive vice-president for economics and the recovery funds. In the end, like at US corporates, Fitto got the title but not the power. He will “only” be in charge of cohesion funds. As the criteria for allocating EU money to projects was decided under the last multiannual budget negotiations, the job involves announcing which projects have been awarded EU cash. In any case, control over the EU’s budget and spending is supervised and coordinated, i.e. controlled, by Valdis Dombrovskis, a figure who can be relied on by German austerity junkies to stop the southern Europeans being too generous with German taxpayers’ cash.
A final comment: who knew that von der Leyen had such a wicked sense of humour? Giving Hungary’s Olivér Várhelyi responsibility for animal welfare (a total non-job) and health (a more important portfolio) is hilarious. As there isn’t a Commission portfolio for paperclips, this was the next best thing. Várhelyi is almost certain to be rejected by the European Parliament as punishment for his boss’ appalling sucking up to Putin and his own terrible performance as a member of VDL 1.0. Expect Orbán to propose the very competent Enikő Győri, currently an MEP but more importantly former state secretary for European affairs and ambassador to Spain and Italy, when Várhelyi is rejected.
For more of Simon Taylor’s writings visit his Substack.
