Veronica Anghel / Mar 2026
Photo: Shutterstock
On 5 March, EU ambassadors rejected a proposal from the European Commission that would have allowed Ukraine to formally join the European Union before completing the reforms required for membership. The idea – informally described as “reverse enlargement” – suggested formalising Ukraine’s ongoing integration by allowing membership first and reforms later.
The rejection might appear to signal hesitation about Ukraine’s EU future. In reality, it reflects a different tension within European enlargement policy. Russia’s invasion has transformed Ukraine’s accession bid into a geopolitical project closely linked to European security. Yet member states remain reluctant to abandon the traditional merit-based framing to EU enlargement, and even more reluctant to explain the benefits of fast-forward enlargement to national constituencies.
The result is an increasingly visible dual track. Formal accession is likely to proceed cautiously, shaped by institutional constraints inside the EU and the pace of reforms in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine’s practical integration into EU policies is already advancing through a growing number of programmes, markets and joint regulatory frameworks.
The Flexible Nature of EU Membership
Russia’s invasion has fundamentally altered the political context of enlargement. What was once treated largely as a technical process of regulatory convergence has become a strategic instrument for anchoring Ukraine in Europe’s economic and security architecture.
The Commission’s proposal for “reverse enlargement” attempted to acknowledge this new reality. Instead of waiting for a single final accession moment, the idea was to formalise the gradual integration that is already occurring across several policy areas. The proposal aimed to preserve the credibility of the EU’s membership promise to Ukraine while creating an institutional framework for the staged integration already underway.
However, the concept proved politically difficult to sell. Framing the proposal as “membership first, reforms later” appeared to challenge the core principle of merit-based accession. For member states, the terminology suggested a radical departure from established enlargement practice. The proposal was therefore rejected, and capitals publicly reaffirmed their commitment to a conventional accession pathway.
Yet the political rejection of “reverse enlargement” does not alter the broader trajectory of EU–Ukraine relations. In practice, the European Union has already begun to operationalise enlargement as a system of staged integration, gradually incorporating Ukraine into its governance structures before formal membership. (I have written elsewhere why the EU pursues a strategy of widening and deepening at the same time to more efficiently manage its resources and avoid the tragedy of the commons.)
Several recent developments illustrate this shift. After Russia’s invasion, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive, allowing millions of Ukrainians to live, work and access services across the EU. In January 2026, Ukraine was also incorporated into the EU’s “Roam Like at Home” mobile roaming area, extending a benefit usually reserved for the single market.
Ukraine has also gained access to several major EU programmes, including Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, and Creative Europe. In the energy sector, Ukraine’s electricity grid has been synchronised with the continental European network, while “Solidarity Lanes”, the EU’s emergency transport corridors, were created to maintain trade flows despite Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian ports.
Financial integration has advanced as well. Through the Ukraine Facility (2024–2027), the EU has committed up to €50 billion in financial support tied to reform benchmarks. Ukraine can also participate in SAFE – the €150 billion instrument launched in 2025 to support joint European defence procurement – alongside EU member states. The EU also pledged to borrow on capital markets to support Ukraine’s budget and military expenses for the next two years – a promise only pro-Russian Hungarian leader Viktor Orban has reneged on.
Taken together, these initiatives demonstrate how Ukraine is being gradually embedded in EU economic, regulatory and security frameworks.
At the same time, this integration remains conditional. Participation in EU programmes and market access can be modified or withdrawn in response to political developments inside the EU and in Ukraine. The EU’s decision in 2025 to reintroduce import restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural products illustrates the reversible nature of this relationship. Until formal membership occurs, Ukraine’s access to EU policies remains politically contingent.
The gradual approach to integration also reflects internal institutional constraints within the EU itself. Enlargement requires institutional adaptation, particularly regarding decision-making rules, budgetary arrangements and the political management of vetoes by member states.
To reduce the risk of blockages, accession negotiations have been organised around clusters of policy areas – including rule of law, the internal market and external relations – rather than individual chapters. This structure lowers the number of opportunities for a single member state to halt progress.
At the same time, the EU is developing mechanisms that could allow candidate countries to participate in specific policy areas before full membership. These sectoral arrangements may include energy market coupling, payment system interoperability, and customs or transit integration. Typically implemented through narrowly defined legal acts, they allow gradual integration while preserving safeguards and suspension mechanisms if EU rules are breached.
Financial instruments are increasingly tied directly to reform outcomes. Under results-based financing schemes, EU funds could be released only when specific benchmarks are met, reinforcing conditionality while enabling deeper economic integration.
Equally important are the administrative linkages created through participation in EU programmes and agency networks. Ukrainian institutions are already cooperating with several EU governance structures, including the EU Space Programme, EU4Health and the Connecting Europe Facility. Such interactions gradually familiarise Ukrainian administrations with EU regulatory practices well before formal membership.
Taken together, these mechanisms illustrate how enlargement is already evolving into a staged process that protects the functioning of the EU’s core policies – particularly the single market – while expanding integration step by step.
Yet technical integration alone does not resolve one of enlargement’s persistent challenges: public support. While many Europeans support Ukraine politically, attitudes towards enlargement remain uneven across member states.
Unequal Public Support
According to the 2025 Eurobarometer, 56 percent of Europeans believe their country would benefit from future enlargement. Support is highest in countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Finland and Poland, where it averages around 74 percent. By contrast, France, Czechia, Austria and Germany record significantly lower levels of support, closer to 45 percent.
Opposition correlates with concerns about migration, corruption and the potential perceived costs of enlargement for European taxpayers.
Public opinion on Ukraine’s accession specifically is also divided. A 2025 European University Institute–YouGov poll suggests that support for fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership has stabilised at roughly 50 percent over the past three years. Such modest and uneven levels of support complicate decision-making in national capitals.
Threat perceptions and disinformation play an important role. In countries closest to the frontline, disinformation is rampant and oftentimes supported by political elites – in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, support for Ukraine tends to be lower and often correlates with the perception that Russia does not pose a broader threat to European security. In contrast, Nordic countries such as Finland and Denmark – where Russia is widely perceived as a direct security threat – display some of the strongest public support for Ukraine in the EU.
At the same time, the EU has strong incentives to maintain pro-European sentiment inside Ukraine itself. Experiences in the Western Balkans have demonstrated the risks of promising membership without delivering visible progress.
Public support for EU accession in Ukraine remains high. According to the Razumkov Centre, 83 percent of Ukrainians support joining the EU. Yet trust in the EU has declined somewhat since the early stages of the war. Surveys by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology show that 49 percent of Ukrainians trusted the EU at the end of 2025, compared with 65 percent in 2023. Expectations about the speed of accession are also cautious, with only 24 percent believing membership will occur within the next five years.
The rejection of “reverse enlargement” does not fundamentally alter the direction of EU–Ukraine relations. Rather, it reflects member states’ preference to preserve the logic of transformative conditionality while managing domestic political constraints.
In practice, Ukraine’s integration into the European Union is already advancing faster than the formal accession timetable. Through gradual participation in EU programmes, markets and governance structures, the EU is steadily embedding Ukraine within its institutional architecture.
Formal membership may take time. But Ukraine’s integration into the European Union is already underway.
