Three priorities for a meaningful EU-UK Reset

Photo: Wikimedia Commons

 

As UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer attends today’s informal meeting of EU leaders, both sides are committed to a “reset” in their relationship after Brexit. Yet while the political climate has improved over the last six months, progress remains largely rhetorical.

Letting the reset devolve into a symbolic exercise would be a consequential strategic failure, especially as global shifts make closer EU-UK cooperation essential to defending the integrity of the Western alliance. More specifically, failure to take concrete steps at the first joint summit later this year could drive the EU and the UK further apart – not by design, but by neglect.

So what could be done?

First, agree on a refreshed Political Declaration. Both sides currently have distinct views on which aspects of their relationship require improvements or revisions. The UK seeks marginal improvements to the current arrangements, including lower trade barriers for agrifood, more ambitious services arrangements, and more effective cooperation on energy. The EU would like to see new mobility arrangements for young people, an updated fisheries deal and more effective arrangements for trade in energy.

What is lacking is a shared articulation of common objectives that includes a joint response to the collective challenges Europe is facing in terms of security, economic competitiveness and democratic resilience, and a shared political roadmap to guide substantive policy discussions on selected issues.

A new declaration would replace the outdated version 2019, which was agreed alongside the Withdrawal Agreement (WA). This has since been overtaken by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and neither of the two documents recognise the profound global shifts that have taken place since then.

Scoping out what is possible within each other’s red lines would require some difficult discussions. If the UK is interested in genuinely deeper cooperation, it would need to demonstrate its readiness to commit to ongoing alignment with EU rules and incur new financial obligations.

For the EU’s part, this would mean exploring objectives that are currently incompatible with existing third-country frameworks but may be deemed more acceptable if a new balance of rights and obligations can be established with the UK.

A second priority should be to launch talks on a new Security and Defence Partnership (SDP). The SDP is a new instrument that the EU is using to improve security ties with likeminded partners. In 2024, it concluded six such partnerships with third countries, including with Japan, South Korea and Norway. These partnerships are non-binding, political agreements and can flexibly cover areas of cooperation where the two sides see maximum benefits.

A similar partnership with the UK would signal political intent and provide a clear roadmap for developing more formal arrangements on specific aspects of security and defence cooperation further down the line. Because the Partnership would be non-binding, it can be agreed relatively quickly provided that political agreement exists on both sides. Nor does it require being tied to the broader “package” of other negotiating issues as part of the reset.

At a minimum, the SDP should cover the support of Ukraine, where the EU and the UK share a critical interest in supporting Ukraine’s defence and ensuring Russia gains no strategic advantage from its invasion.

It should also address the tricky issue of defence policy.  Over the past years, the EU has become more open to include non-EU countries in defence initiatives, such as PESCO, and is involving non-EU companies in the proposed European Defence Investment Plan (EDIP). Building on this, the SDP could include a commitment to involving the UK in emerging EU defence programmes and instruments, subject to agreement on clear rules for participation, such as financial contributions and data-sharing protocols.

Further issues include peace and crisis management, where the EU is committed to bringing partners into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations but lacks an agreement with the UK. Improving consultations and dialogues between the UK and the EU’s foreign policy machinery would enable a more formal, structured cooperation on foreign and security policy issues. This could help to respond to a number of security challenges in a more coordinated manner – ranging from the crisis in the Middle East to strategies on the Indo-Pacific.

Thirdly, both sides should set up a new Economic Security and Resilience Dialogue. EU-UK cooperation is largely confined to G7 discussions and ad-hoc political and diplomatic exchanges. With economic protectionism on the rise and continued economic threat by China, the return of Donald Trump only adds to the risks of economic fragmentation – this time to the Western alliance itself.

Both sides have a shared interest in defending the ‘economic West’ as much as ‘the political West’ by protecting an open global economy and a rules-based trading system. For the EU, which is committed to developing an ‘economic security doctrine’, working with like-minded partners like the UK should be an important part of its strategy.

A new dialogue, at both ministerial and technical levels, could help coordinate policy responses to emerging economic security challenges, such as sanctions, export controls, FDI screening, trade defence instruments and strategic industrial policies. Additionally, it could facilitate cooperation on energy and climate-related issues, such as the implementation of EU and UK carbon border adjustment mechanisms, where greater cooperation is essential. 

As the Western alliance faces growing challenges, the upcoming EU-UK political summit presents an opportunity to revitalise an important relationship – but one that has been weakened by both animosity and inertia in recent years. This can be achieved only if leaders on both sides are prepared to invest meaningfully in resetting the relations and demonstrating a genuine shift in attitude towards one another. 

For the UK, this requires re-prioritizing Europe as the central pillar of its strategic outlook, acknowledging that its long-term security and prosperity are inextricably linked to that of the EU. It must also accept that deeper, more substantial relations come hand in hand with new responsibilities.

For the EU, this means moving beyond conventional frameworks and recognising the UK as a strategic partner, rather than an ordinary third country.

 

This article is based on the Policy Brief Three Priorities for a Meaningful EU-UK Reset, co-authored with Daniela Schwarzer and Anton Spisak which can be found here.