Riccardo Perissich / Sep 2025
Mario Draghi. Photo: Shutterstock
Scanning the European media, among the various messages of "euro-pessimism" to which we are exposed daily, one concerns the disappointing follow-up to the Draghi report on boosting the competitiveness of the European economy. This concern was forcefully reiterated by Mario Draghi himself in his recent speech in Brussels.
Recently, some analysts explained that the Draghi report contained 383 measures and that, one year after its publication, "only about 10%" had been implemented, while 20% had been partially implemented. These figures, the basis for which I am unaware, brought back old memories. Between 1986 and 1994, I was responsible within the European Commission, chaired by Jacques Delors, for the overall coordination of the work related to the implementation of the White Paper on completing the single market of the then EEC.
I also headed the Directorate-General directly responsible for harmonizing industrial standards and the free movement of people and professions, thus covering a substantial part of the program. The entire programme comprised some 300 measures, with a few more added during the course of the work. Those who remember will recall that the White Paper was enthusiastically approved by the European Council in Milan in June 1985. With what result? Well, by the end of 1986, the implementation rate of the program was almost zero. The process finally got underway thanks to a vigorous joint effort by the Commission and the British Presidency of the Council, with the adoption of a dozen directives on fascinating topics such as harmonizing safety standards for forklifts.
From that point on, however, the process gained momentum and never stopped. Four years later, in 1988, the European Council noted that approximately 50% of the program had been implemented and proudly declared that this result was a triumph for Europe. So much so that Delors felt the situation was ripe enough to set a new objective: the euro. I would be tempted to add that the implementation of Margaret Thatcher's ambitious reform programme in the UK took about a decade, but this comparison would take us too far afield.
Let's return to the present. If we consider not only that the current situation and the challenges facing Europe are far more difficult than back then, but also that the program proposed by Mr. Draghi is objectively more complex than the one in the White Paper of that era, what justifies the prevailing pessimism? Why would a 10% success rate today be a disaster when zero implementation back then was merely an incentive to accelerate? Wouldn't it be more appropriate to examine the situation more soberly, without being overly complacent? This is a crucial question because the problems raised by the Draghi report affect not only the internal strength of the European economy and society, but also Europe's hopes of regaining an active role on the international stage. Let's start with a question. What does "implementing a complex programme" mean in the political and institutional context of today's Europe? This is an important question, especially considering that some of Draghi's proposals, such as those concerning defense, lie on the margins, or even outside, the competence of the EU institutions.
First of all, the political feasibility of the ideas contained in a programme like Draghi's can only be assessed once each of them is translated into operational measures, including their legal and financial implications. In order to be implemented, the proposals in the report must therefore take the form of specific measures on which the institutions—the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament—can take a position within their respective areas of competence. In the case of the approximately 300 proposals in the White Paper on the Single Market, some already existed, in some cases for a long time; however, the majority had to be developed by the Commission.
In the case of the Draghi report, virtually all the ideas must be translated into concrete proposals. To take just one, but very important, example: what exactly does the implementation of the Savings and Investment Union—that is, the unification of the capital market—mean in practice? To this first difficulty is added a second. As with the White Paper, governments and the European Parliament may agree in principle with the objectives of the Draghi program, but this does not necessarily mean that they agree with each individual measure. It is even certain that they will have different priorities.
This is where the problem of the cumbersome and slow-moving European machinery comes in—a complexity that we can criticise, but with which we must currently contend, and which is certainly more complicated today with 27 member states than it was with only 12. Let us also not forget that very often, before the effects are felt by citizens and businesses, the decisions made in Brussels must be translated into national measures. It would also be interesting to have an analysis of the number of measures that can now be adopted by qualified majority, compared to the situation we had back then. Furthermore, it is certain that the current challenge involves political compromises, for example, in balancing competitiveness and the Green Deal, or in regulating the digital economy and artificial intelligence, which are more difficult to manage than before.
The sharing of sovereignty is also a more complex issue today. One strategic question strongly influences the entire political debate: the role and importance of common funding. The dilemma is obvious. On the one hand, as Mario Draghi explains so well, achieving the objectives requires a qualitative leap in the volume and quality of public and private investment. A substantial part of the answer lies in the unification of the capital market, but the importance of public investment, and in particular, a common effort, cannot be denied. On the other hand, however, focusing on this aspect without first defining the characteristics of the entire ecosystem risks leading the discussion into a stalemate. This could jeopardize an agreement, even on the less controversial non-financial measures. In this case, the experience of the White Paper is of little help. Unless...?
It is indeed useful to recall that Delors, momentarily forgetting that he was a socialist, initially refused to link the removal of trade barriers, which would presumably benefit the strongest economies, to the introduction of financial solidarity for the weaker ones. Instead, he waited until the programme had gained momentum and started to yield its first results before proposing his "package" of financial solidarity, which resulted in a substantial increase in structural funds and the common budget. The above leads me to suspect that even the 10% implementation rate of the Draghi report included in the analyses mentioned earlier may be somewhat optimistic, but at the same time to conclude that the prevailing pessimism is unfounded.
The priority, therefore, is to overcome this pessimism. What should be suggested? First, the Commission should develop a programme to quickly translate the objectives of the Draghi report into practical proposals and, on this basis, establish a reliable and easily communicable mechanism for monitoring results. For the implementation of the White Paper, the political and psychological tool of deadlines was used, the most important being 1992. At that time, it served as a political benchmark. In the current situation, the misuse of deadlines in the case of the Green Deal justifies doubts about their political effectiveness.
The issue of priorities also arises. At the time of the White Paper, we decided to reject the need for such an approach for fear of being subjected to blackmail by member states; instead, we decided to focus our efforts on individual proposals as they emerged. The current situation is more complex. There are certain topics, such as those related to the capital markets, which are undoubtedly a priority, given that many other things depend on them.
However, Delors' experience allows us to draw another guiding principle: the idea that to overcome resistance, we must first overcome pessimism, and that to do so, it is useful to focus on things that are achievable and easily perceptible. I am thinking, for example, of the issue of energy costs, which is at the heart of citizens' and businesses' concerns. It is worth recalling that the main factor that determined the "success" of the White Paper in the eyes of Europeans was not the number of decisions taken, but the fact that at a certain point, European businesses were convinced of the project's credibility and began to factor its anticipated results into their investment decisions. To overcome pessimism, it is important to keep in mind that momentum begets momentum, and that nothing generates success like success itself. In my office, I kept a photograph of a forklift truck, which I cherished.
Visit also the Telos website
