Sébastien Maillard / Apr 2025
Photo: Getty images
The Franco-German engine has been running on empty for too long. Despite efforts on both sides, Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz never sympathized personally. The outgoing three-party coalition made it often difficult to come up with one clear German position. Political turmoil in the French Parliament weakened the French President who blasted it last year. But the situation is changing dramatically. Friedrich Merz, the incoming Chancellor, is already acting as one, taking the lead over his ‘grand coalition’. Macron is benefiting from the earth-shattering geopolitical context to regain some political clout. And both have already built a dynamic working relationship, meeting several times.
When dealing with Merz, Paris overall feels at ease as it can be with a classic Rhenan Francophile. A Christian Democrat, whose mentor was Wolfgang Schäuble and who has European integration in his political DNA. And whose key positions are more aligned with French views. Macron could have finally found the close German partner he has lacked on the other side of the Rhine since 2017. During his election campaign, Merz spoke in favour of sending long-range missiles (Taurus) to Ukraine, that Scholz was opposing. To allow much needed public investment, he has loosened the country's public debt brake by managing to change, with the outgoing Bundestag, the disputed constitutional rule limiting the federal government's annual deficit. New funds have been announced to finance investments in defence and in levelling-up infrastructures. Pleasing to French ears, Merz has always considered the withdrawal from nuclear power to be a strategic error - although he acknowledges that its revival looks now unrealistic. Although a staunch transatlantist, he even now sounds Gaullist with his ambition to make the Federal Republic of Germany become independent from the United States.
Another driver of present Franco-German dynamics is that both leaders are in a hurry. Knowing he now only has two years left in office, Macron keeps repeating the need to “accelerate”. Merz understands settling Germany’s structural flaws cannot wait.
Last but not least, the rest of the EU cannot afford anymore having no impetus from its two main Member States in such a watershed moment for the fate of European integration.
All these favourable and compelling circumstances don’t mean the two countries suddenly agree on everything. Both remain at loggerheads on the Mercosur deal. France keeps advocating in favour of new joint borrowing at EU level to finance defence investments that Germany resists. Berlin is more open than Paris in allowing British companies to take part in European initiatives for the industry. As always, Franco-German closeness requires efforts on both sides to compromise.
But even if it does so, the purpose of the Franco-German engine is no longer to claim pulling the whole of Europe on its own. Increasingly and at various levels, the duo is giving way to a trio with Poland, through the revived Weimar format. Friedrich Merz is planning his first official visits to both Paris and Warsaw. For his part, President Macron is preparing a summit with the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, to sign a friendship treaty in the vein of those recently concluded with Rome and Madrid, while a major bilateral Franco-British summit is on the horizon to revamp the Lancaster Treaties on defence.
One should thus not expect a return to the old-style Franco-German relationship. Rather, this historically unique relationship can play its indispensable part in a broader game that responds to the turbulent change of era underway. Paris and Berlin will regain their driving force if they remain open to other partners and focus on a host of key issues. The capital markets union, renamed the savings and investments union, is one of them, to help finance the threefold digital, energy and security transition guiding today’s European agenda. In this same perspective, the Franco-German alliance must also put all its weight behind European industrial production and the emergence of new European champions, as called for in the Draghi Report. Like Paris, Merz wants to revise European competition law.
Yet, regaining momentum does not just rely on steadfast diplomatic efforts and bold political willingness. The scope of the Franco-German impetus on Europe will depend first and foremost on how the respective political situations in each country unfold. In Germany, a two-party coalition should spare the country from the internal tensions that have exhausted the previous three-party coalition. In France, government stability is a condition to be taken seriously by its European partners. Above all, on both sides of the Rhine, the spectacular virulence of the far right, supported by Trump and Putin alike, give the two leaders an obligation to achieve results quickly. Otherwise, the Merz-Macron leadership may end up being the last of its kind.
