Susi Dennison / Nov 2026

Image: Shutterstock
AS COP31 draws to a close, the Australian Presidency have tried a new trick to breathe life into the ailing process of international cooperation around climate targets. The draft conclusions that are circulating in Anatalya are unusually long and comprehensive. The logic is presumably that there are so many issues of contention between the countries participating in the conference of parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, that by including all of them , some at least will slip through unargued. Not every diplomatic battle can be fought in a short space of time. At the time of writing, some of the biggest push backs to the ambition within them are likely to come from China, India and oil producing countries on the fossil fuel phase out, and overshoot of 1.5 degrees above 1990s levels language, from OECD countries (including Europeans) on the climate finance language, and from most vulnerable countries on the level of financing for adaptation – currently proposed at $1.2 billion by 2035 compared to the perceived current global need at above $4 billion.
But the slightly pessimistic outlook this implies for the results of this year’s major climate cooperation event is far from being the whole story when it comes to global action to combat climate change. The stakes are higher than ever, in competitiveness terms as the world decarbonises, but also increasingly in security terms, as the physical consequences of climate change are becoming harder to ignore -- including increasingly in Europe -- placing pressure on infrastructure, energy systems, and overall resilience. In their industrial policy and energy decisions, countries around the globe are naturally choosing to manage the risks by leaning into the green transition.
Against this backdrop, as well as continuing to exert influence in international cooperation around climate, the EU needs to play the cards it has now to manage its green transition, to avoid the turbulent global environment taking the choices away from European policymakers, businesses and people. Europeans have the power to do this through partnerships with other global players which can guarantee the supply of raw and engineered materials, and components that European firms need, while contributing to global climate action.
The case for doing so is ever more evident.China’s high profile weaponisation of export controls on rare earths has become a strategic vulnerability for the EU. For example, the IEA found that in 2026, European prices for gallium and heavy rare earths are around five times Chinese domestic prices, while the EU remains highly dependent on China for materials needed for batteries, wind turbines and other clean technologies. It is becoming impossible to assume that the EU can simply turn to alternative countries with access to resources necessary for battery and clean tech production without putting in some more ground work to the relationship, not only because of China’s major dominance (for example over 80% of lithium-ion supply chain capacity according to the IEA in 2026), but also because they are following its suit in their approach. Indonesia - which produces over 60% of global mined nickel, has, in the past year used export restrictions, quotas and greater state control over the sector to push companies toward domestic processing. African countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and the DRC are increasingly restricting exports or seeking domestic processing of minerals such as lithium and cobalt. Many players within the power map of the green transition understand their leverage, and in a hyper transactional environment framed by the US and China, they are increasingly willing to weaponise it.
Europe is not impotent within this picture. However it does need to take stock of its own potential, and be willing to use it strategically in the way it builds partnerships in the new international context. The EU should start this sharper push with a few like-minded partners that have what it lacks. In these partnerships, it should go in with scale of financing and speed, from tailored offers and green markets to guarantees, research and training, regulatory know-how and coalitions.
Historically, the EU has been a super-power in international cooperation – expert at throwing its weight into a rules based system that delivers on global goods. Now that the rules of cooperation are changing, and there has been a breakdown in the global consensus that climate action is a feasible goal in the current geopolitics, leaning into COP and other for a for climate cooperation will not be enough. To underpin its own green transition, and to imbue a sense of achievability in global action to limit climate change, the EU also needs to compete – building a team of like minded partners around it to strengthen the effort.












