Denzil Davidson / Sep 2025
Photo: Shutterstock
There is a hesitation among some in EU capitals about a further deepening of ties with the United Kingdom. Is it wise, it is wondered, to expand co-dependencies with a country which is not reliably warm towards the EU?
This is not a groundless worry. The party leading in the polls, Reform UK, is led by a man who has been relentless in his hostility to the EU. Nigel Farage is committed to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EHCR, a crucial underpinning of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and of the justice and security elements of British-EU co-operation. He is also an admirer of President Trump’s and has sympathised with Russia in its war against Ukraine. If polls today were a prediction of the next election, he would be prime minister with an overall majority.
The perceived risk is exacerbated by the Conservative Party’s position, opposed to much of the Common Understanding agreed between the UK and the EU in May and also potentially committed to withdrawal from the ECHR by the time of the next election. However, the Conservatives remain staunch opponents of Russian aggression and have not aligned themselves with President Trump’s authoritarianism.
Given this political risk, why should the EU treat the UK as a reliable partner?
Let us remember that polls are a snapshot of today, not a prediction of tomorrow, let alone 2028 or 29. Voters are volatile. At one point in the 2010 election campaign the Liberal Democrats led in the polls; they won only 57 seats. For much of the last parliament Conservatives comfortably outstripped the other parties in the polls; some commentators talked of an era of Conservative hegemony. Last year they suffered their worst ever defeat.
That the Conservative Party’s then popularity would not last was not unpredictable: no government led by Boris Johnson was likely to be typified by the competent delivery of public goods or uphold standards of conduct voters would respect. Its parliamentary party, too many of whose members had become addicted to economic irrationality, narcissism and the avoidance of hard choices, was losing its ability to govern even when better led.
Equally now, there are reasons to believe that the landscape will be less favourable to Reform at the next election.
Mid-term polls let voters to voice their unhappiness; many think differently when it comes to the actual decision on whom to entrust with the country’s government. Judging by their recent conference, Reform are not going out of their way to reassure anyone that they are a safe pair of hands. Were either the Labour or Conservative Parties to rediscover some political competence, which is not impossible, Reform would provide them with a target-rich environment: they are on the wrong side of British public opinion on Russia, on Trump, their actual immigration policy is too extreme for most and their openness to vaccine scepticism is also only supported by a small minority. Even now, with a Labour government that has not succeeded in giving the country a clear sense of direction, Sir Keir Starmer leads Farage by six points as preferred prime minister.
Reform are also the most polarising of the political parties. If at the next election a Reform government seems like a real prospect, then heavy tactical voting against them can be expected. So, although a future Reform government is possible, it would be rash to have it as a central scenario. A fragmented parliament is likelier.
In any case, if the risk of a future illiberal government were a bar to investing in a relationship few European countries would hazard co-dependencies with each other: it is perfectly possible that their next elections may see illiberal parties take or share power in France, Germany and Spain, to name but a few.
Neither does hesitation meet the needs of Europe’s geopolitical situation. The security threat to Europe from Russian aggression and the possible loss of American support is at its most dangerous for the next three to four years, by which time European rearmament should have made significant progress.
With the liberal democracies facing a security crisis because of the liberal hegemon’s desertion, liberal powers like the EU must learn to act geopolitically. The European interest would be better served by drawing the UK in as much as possible in support of its security and strategic autonomy. The EU should want allies and potential partners to have every incentive to orient themselves towards Europe; that too is the most urgent reason for the ratification of the EU-Mercosur agreement.
The more winners in the UK there are from deeper British-EU relations the better: there will be more stakeholders to speak out in favour of close ties and more encouragement for the current government to talk to voters about the benefits of what it has achieved. That there will not be more benefits as a result of May’s “reset” of relations (on which notably neither Reform nor the Conservatives saw political mileage in picking a fight about) and its forthcoming implementation is partly a result of the British government’s red lines. Once the agreement in May has been turned into operational text and into practice, it would benefit both sides to think together about how they can further advance their shared strategic interests and re-examine their self-imposed constraints.
This is also a time to think long term. All polls show more British voters think leaving the EU was a mistake than the right choice. Most want closer ties to the EU, even a majority for rejoining, although, like the young St Augustine, not yet. They are overwhelmingly hostile to Presidents Trump and Putin. Over time, the UK’s political parties will find it in their interests to follow majority public opinion. In the long run encouraging a British-EU rapprochement is a one-way winning bet for the EU’s strategic interests. At this time of peril for Europe’s liberal democracies, holding the UK at arm’s length would be a mistake.
The author writes in a personal capacity
