John Springford / Mar 2026
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Vote Leave made the end of free movement a central plank of their referendum campaign, and promised that Britain would introduce a ‘points-based system’ if it left the EU. Several forecasts, including that of the Office of Budget Responsibility, the UK’s fiscal watchdog, assumed that would result in a fall in net migration.
As prime minister, Boris Johnson followed through on Leave’s promise, and the new system, combined with a resurgence of labour demand after the pandemic, led net migration to rise to a peak of over 900,000 in 2023. Keir Starmer then accused the Conservatives of running an “open borders experiment”, and has tightened the system. But to what extent has Brexit – and the new immigration regime that followed – raised the number of foreign-born workers in Britain?
New research by me and Jonathan Portes of King’s College London and UK in a Changing Europe provides estimates of the impact of the end of free movement on the number of EU-born workers in Britain, and the new immigration system on workers born in the rest of the world.
There was a modest rise in the number of foreign-born workers overall, but much larger changes in their origin. By 2024, Brexit had reduced EU-born workers by about 785,000, or 2.3 per cent of the labour force.
Meanwhile, the new migration regime raised non-EU born workers by about 992,000, or 2.95 per cent of the labour force.
The net effect was small – about 207,000 more foreign-born workers, or 0.6 per cent of the labour force.
We used a similar method to the ‘doppelgänger’ studies estimating the impact of Brexit on GDP. We compared HMRC data on foreign-born employees to EU-15 and European Economic Area countries whose trends in foreign-born employment most closely matched the UK’s in the run-up to the Brexit referendum in 2016, and the implementation of the new immigration regime in 2021.
Because many other Western European countries also had a big rise in labour demand after the pandemic, the countries whose trends most matched the UK’s in the 2010s also had big rises in foreign-born workers. But, in those countries, more came from the EU, and fewer from the rest of the world.
What are the implications for the UK’s migration policy? Taking back control of migration hasn’t made a big difference to the numbers, at least so far. But it does seem to make work migration more volatile, as politicians adjust visa eligibility under political pressure.
And according to separate research by James Bowes for UK in a Changing Europe, we appear to be entering a bust, with net migration projected to fall substantially after Rishi Sunak and Kier Starmer’s governments have tightened the system, and as the labour market cools. That will curb GDP growth and tax revenues. And if the economic consequences are serious enough, governments might liberalise the regime again.
Leaving the EU has not resolved the dilemma facing all European governments – between maintaining employment as societies age and political pressure to reduce immigration. EU free movement offers a system in which more individuals make decisions, rather than bureaucrats, who have to use the blunt instrument of visa eligibility to control flows.
Free movement with the EU also opens up a trade policy that is less damaging to the economy. It will be one of the demands the EU will make for significant participation in the single market. Since the UK immigration has been similar to other receiving countries in Europe, control has so far made little difference to outcomes.
The central Brexit trade-off has always between sovereign decision-making and higher trade and output. While ‘taking back control’ appears to have modestly raised employment in Britain so far, a return to free movement would bring bigger benefits.John Springford is an associate fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
The research note, written with Jonathan Portes of King’s College London and UK in a Changing Europe, is available here.
