Nick Westcott / Jan 2026
Image: Shutterstock
President Trump’s action against Venezuela and threats against Greenland reflect the foreign policy set out in the new National Security Strategy (NSS) and Trump’s world view. This has been clear since he took office (as I anticipated last January in the FT).
The NSS itself is a very revealing document, both in what it does and does not say. Its four core messages are clear.
Firstly, the western hemisphere (the Americas) are the US’s sphere of influence. All countries in the region should support and follow the US, or they will be forced to do so. Above all, external allegiances are banned.
Secondly, the Pacific matters and will not be surrendered to China. The support for Asian countries, and specifically for Taiwan, is explicit, though weaker than before, and is conditional on countries paying for their own defence, trading with the US on its terms, and not getting too close to China. India gets a mention, but of a kind that reflects the ambiguous relationship Trump has with Prime Minister Modi.
Thirdly, the US wants Europe to be politically friendly, economically open to US business, self-supporting in defence, and divided. United, Europe is an economic rival to the US and is already acting to constrain the markets and profits of US corporations. To undermine that unity the Strategy supports national conservatism, or “patriotic European parties” as they are called, both where they are already in power in Hungary, the Czech Republic and (ambiguously) Italy, and where they aspire to take power, in Germany (AfD), France (RN) and the UK (Reform), with the argument they can avoid what it calls Europe’s ‘civilizational erasure’ from uncontrolled immigration. The Strategy echoes the analysis already common in Russia and China: that Europe is a continent in decline, with a stagnant economy, an unaffordable social welfare model, weak politicians, an inability to defend itself, and an irritating attachment to democracy and values that it preaches to others. They believe Europe is ripe to be picked apart, like the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in 1914.
Fourthly, above all, it shows that an ‘America First’ foreign policy is primarily commercial, aimed at profiting American businesses, including the President’s own. The US wants customers and clients, not allies or economic competitors. It is not so much ‘transactional’ as ‘extractive’, as Bruno Macaes has described it. ‘Everybody’s going to make a lot of money,’ as Trump promised when signing the Rwanda-DRC ‘peace’ deal on 4 December. It reflects the views of the MAGA movement and tech bros around Trump. But the Strategy is also deliberately personal, presented as President Trump’s, ‘the President of Peace’ who claims already to have settled eight conflicts. As other actions demonstrate, American diplomats no longer represent the United States, but President Trump and his political agenda.
Nowhere is there mention of international law, the UN or the multilateral system. These silences speak for themselves.
On Europe, the US argument has a kernel of truth. Europeans have become complacent, depending for security on a US that was politically drifting away from them, and locked in political systems which prioritise domestic welfare over external security. Trump may not have threatened to leave NATO, but has no intention of being dragged in to a war to defend NATO allies. He regards it more as a protection racket: the US will only continue to provide a (pretty limited) security guarantee if Europe does what it wants. And the first thing it wants is Greenland.
Katie Miller’s tweet, with the US flag superimposed on Greenland, reflects Trump’s own view, confirmed by her husband, Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller. The policy is effectively imperialist. Trump wants to expand US territory and make the US richer through advantageous business with client states. Step one has been to intimidate Latin America by seizing President Maduro, showing the US willingness to use its power against those who disagree. Step two is to enlarge the US, with the biggest acquisition of land since the Louisiana purchase.
This is a threat not just to Denmark but to the whole of Europe. How should it respond?
- Firstly, respond collectively. The EU must mobilise itself to demonstrate that US and Russian efforts to divide Europe are not working. Sure, there are different views within it, but a divided Europe risks being carved up between the US and Russia. All countries, large and small, will suffer. The EU may be no match for the US militarily, but united it can resist US political or economic pressure.
- Secondly, respond swiftly and firmly to debunk the argument. If the US is seriously worried about the threat from Russia or China, an effective defence is to work with NATO, not destroy it, as a takeover of Greenland would. Combined, the US and Europe can defend the North Atlantic against anyone. But if the US effectively declares war on Denmark, and therefore the rest of NATO, by seizing Greenland, the North Atlantic and Arctic become free play.
- Thirdly, lobby Congress. The only group capable of restraining Trump before the mid-terms in November are the Republicans in Congress. Leader of the House Mike Johnson’s hesitations about the use of force are encouraging. He will no doubt come under pressure to toe the line, but if other Republicans share his views, he will stick with it.
- Fourthly, change the public narrative. Trump’s line is that he needs Greenland for national security reasons. That is bunk, as is his jibe that Denmark added only one dog-sled to reinforce Greenland. But that is what gets covered not only in the US media but world-wide because Trump is a genius at swamping the zone with his point of view. Tell a lie, a big one, and keep repeating it until people believe it. The only effective response is to swamp right back with the truth – what Denmark and Europe are doing to invest in Arctic security; why the US already has all the agreements it needs to assure its own security; etc. And the truth needs to be everywhere, on Fox News, on social media, in the press, and repeated by every European representative.
- Fifthly, actively build alliances with other countries that want to preserve the international rule of law and resist a world carved into spheres of influence by great powers. In Latin America, Africa, South Asia, the OECD and Commonwealth, most countries would suffer from a ‘might is right’ world. This needs proactive diplomacy – and domestic concerns, for example from Italian farmers worried about competition, need to be overcome to strike trade deals with Mercosur and others.
- Sixthly, have an alternative to offer. The neatest way out of this confrontation is a new, strengthened defence treaty between Denmark, Norway, Canada and the US for the security of the Arctic, which Trump can trumpet as his success, acknowledging the US’s leading role in the region, but recognising the sovereignty of others.
Trump is an opportunist. He is not definitely planning to seize Greenland by force. But he has shown in Venezuela that he would be willing to do that, and wants Europe to believe it, so that European governments are sufficiently alarmed to offer him concessions. This is how a protection racket works.
Europeans should remember the African folk tale. The elephant is the biggest creature in the jungle and immune to attack. Not even the lion, the king of beasts, will attack the elephant for fear of being trampled. But the elephant is frightened of one of the smallest creatures – the bee. Because they act together to defend their nest, a swarm of bees can cause the elephant agony by stinging its ears, its eyes, inside its trunk. So the elephant will never trample a bees’ nest, but gives it respect and a wide berth.
There is a clear lesson for the UK in all this. In the long term, the only safe place for the UK to be in this turbulent, transactional, multipolar world is back inside the EU, benefitting from the Single Market, cooperating on defence and able to influence EU policies from within. If the EU falls apart, or the UK remains outside, Britain’s options are limited to becoming a mere client state of the US, or being internationally powerless and irrelevant. In retrospect, Brexit could not have been more untimely. Just as the US became less dependable, the UK made itself more dependent on it; and just as Europe had more need of the UK, we left. Britain would not be easily welcomed back, but strategically, it is the only safe place to be. Whatever the domestic challenges, the British government needs swiftly to start making the case for more defence spending and for rejoining the EU.
