Steven Everts / Oct 2024
Photo: Shutterstock
Georgia is on a knife edge. On 26 October, crucial parliamentary elections will decide the country’s political future. Either it continues on the current government’s authoritarian path, taking its cue from the Kremlin – or it can begin to rebuild its democracy and revert to its pro-EU trajectory.
These days, European policymakers are busy with themselves, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and the upcoming US elections, making it difficult for them to focus on other concerns. But that is a mistake. Georgia matters, as a battleground in the global struggle for democracy and the right of people to decide their own political future. This is one of these moments where history can go either way.
The statistic one hears most often in Georgia is that around 80 % of its population is resolutely pro-democracy and pro-EU, as opinion surveys regularly indicate. Yet, since 2012 the country has been governed by Georgian Dream (GD), a party that has gradually embraced authoritarianism, tightening its control over all state institutions including the judiciary and the electoral commission, while harassing political opponents and independent media.
Two recent laws have caused uproar in the country: the so-called foreign agents law and the ‘law on family values and the protection of minors’, which targets and discriminates against LGBTQ+ groups. These laws are fundamentally at odds with core EU values and incompatible with Georgia’s stated EU aspirations. When GD leader Bidzina Ivanishvili announced his intention to ‘abolish all opposition parties’ after the elections it may have sounded absurd to European ears, but this threat must be taken seriously. This, then, is the context in which Georgians are going to the polls.
The EU has watched Georgia’s democratic backsliding with growing alarm. In earlier years, the direction of travel had been towards closer ties: since March 2017, Georgians have enjoyed visa-free travel to the EU – which is popular – and the country received official EU candidate status last December. These steps were designed to anchor Georgia on a pro-EU path, even though the GD government had only partially fulfilled the ‘9 steps’, set out by the European Commission. The idea, or hope, was to prevent more democratic erosion and reduce Moscow’s influence. Instead, the situation has only deteriorated since then.
In response, the EU has since June 2024 de facto halted the EU accession process, frozen €121 million in budgetary support and stopped sending high-level visitors to Tbilisi, to avoid appearing supportive of the GD government. The US has gone further, imposing targeted sanctions on key individuals involved in the violent crackdown on protesters and visa restrictions on 60 individuals responsible for undermining democracy.
With election day approaching, all the talk in Tbilisi is of the expected outcome and what will follow. The atmosphere is feverish and extremely polarised. There is not a single TV or public debate where both government and opposition take part. Opposition parties face intimidation, while Georgian Dream exerts control of the information space and uses state resources for party purposes. Despite all this, opposition parties - though fragmented - still believe they can prevent GD from getting a majority. Indeed, independent polling suggests GD will not take more than 35 % of the vote. As 90 % of votes will be cast electronically, they also believe the margin for electoral fraud is limited. The real question is what will happen after the elections. If Georgian Dream indeed loses, will it simply pack up and go?
This seems highly unlikely. There is now a well-established playbook whereby authoritarian governments use all state resources, including riot police and security forces, to control protests and stay in power. Most alarmingly, some reports suggest the government has released thousands of prisoners in recent weeks, potentially to free up space for post-election detentions.
What should the EU do?
First, it must realise the gravity of the situation and muster the necessary political focus and resources – no matter the limited bandwidth in Brussels right now. The recent debate in the European Parliament on 8 October and the upcoming discussions among EU foreign ministers and EU leaders at the EU summit of 17-18 October are encouraging signs.
Second, the EU should stress that it is of course for Georgians to decide their future. But that is precisely the point. The EU must express its clear expectations on the need for the elections to be truly free and fair – and make clear its honest assessment of these elections afterwards. The EU must also emphasise that all parties should abide by democratic principles in the days and weeks after the elections. Any violent crackdown will require a firm EU response, including the option of targeted sanctions.
Finally, the EU needs to make clear the fateful choice facing Georgians. The contradiction between the 80-90 % of Georgians saying they want to get closer to the EU, yet 35 % or more supporting the GD, is unsustainable. Georgian citizens must understand why the EU has frozen the accession path and its budgetary support. GD’s argument that it is pursuing the EU path while simultaneously contemplating a one-party state is simply unbelievable. And a post-election GD change of course, breaking with Moscow and re-adopting an EU compatible agenda, seems unlikely.
These elections do feel like a referendum: democracy and Brussels, or isolation and Moscow? It is vital that Georgians make their electoral choice, freely and based on a full understanding of the consequences. And they should do so in the knowledge that the EU will continue to stand with those wishing to defend and uphold democracy when it is under attack.
Steven Everts travelled to Georgia between 2-4 October as part of a study trip for think tankers and experts organised by Gnomon Wise and CIDOB.
For more by the author, visit the EUISS website.
