Andrew Duff / Mar 2026
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
The Labour government risks boring itself rigid by the constant reiteration of its pledge never to rejoin the EU, or to negotiate a new customs union agreement with the EU, or to try to re-enter the single market, or to allow a return to freedom of movement for peoples between the UK and EU. Ministers even stuck to this mantra when confronted by the delinquency of a re-elected Donald J. Trump. Prime Minister Starmer himself doubled down, insisting that it was not and would never be necessary for the UK to choose between Europe and America. At least the defenestration of Peter Mandelson, who plumped alarmingly for the US option, has buried that conceit.
It becomes clearer, moreover, that some of Starmer's cabinet colleagues — including his main leadership rivals — have come to regret Labour's promise to "make Brexit work". The government's efforts to "reset" Boris Johnson's botched Brexit deal have been slower and more laborious than they anticipated. The EU Commission rightly insists that the UK should pay a fair share of its costs, accept a modicum of free movement, and obey EU rules as the price of cherry-picking.
The defence imperative
Refreshingly, on 14 February at the Munich Security Conference, the prime minister declared there is "no British security without Europe, and no European security without Britain. ... We are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore. ... The status quo is not fit for purpose". Starmer may be warming to the idea of joining an intergovernmental security treaty committed to preparing European common defence. This would involve the integrationist minded EU member states, as well as Ukraine, Canada and Norway, while excluding the US and the EU's neutral and nationalist states, such as Hungary.
The new treaty would cleave as much as possible to EU objectives, institutions and agencies, as well as using NATO assets where relevant and possible. Like the original Schengen agreement, the signatories would commit to folding up their treaty inside the EU proper once political circumstances permit. They would establish a European security council in which the UK would have a good claim to a permanent seat.
For Britain, the way back to Europe is more likely to be through the vector of defence than by pussyfooting around the margins of the EU internal market. Popular support for Ukraine and growing hostility to Trump spurs the rise of pro-EU sentiment in British public opinion. Such support could be leveraged to repair the damage of Brexit.
Single market mirage
In her Mais lecture of 17 March, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves insisted on developing a "deeper relationship" with the European Union. She estimates the cost of Brexit at 8% of GDP. She fears the UK is stranded between the world's powerful trading blocs. Closer alignment of the UK economy with the EU will benefit the whole of Europe, she said. In picking where and when to align, she will be guided by the principles of British National Interest, including the need for stability. She will join the Commission's drive to reduce the regulatory burden and engage more closely with business to influence emerging EU laws and regulation. The UK aims to join the EU's stalled €90 bn loan scheme for Ukraine.
So far so good. Reeves is clearly correct to argue that lower regulation, higher investment and reduced trade friction is in the mutual interest of the UK and EU. She points to AI strategy as a potential area of UK EU cooperation but gave no other clues as to where Britain should seek dynamic alignment with the EU. Nothing was said to the City of London audience about the financial market industry.
Reeves seems strangely reluctant to accept the logic of her own argument that higher growth flows from increased volumes of trade in goods and services. Is it not obvious that single market access goes hand in hand with a customs union that simplifies rules of origin for companies and lowers barriers? She has missed a good opportunity to change the dynamics of the UK's relationship with the EU and lower UK borrowing costs, which are the highest in G7.
It was especially unfortunate, therefore, that she reiterated, in an answer to a question, that the government is still opposed to rejoining a customs union, the EU single market and freedom of movement. One could hear the City audience sigh. Are Labour's red lines now to be elevated into the Chancellor's "National Interest Principles"?
The British have always found it easier to think in terms of military alliances than economic integration. Their concept of European partnership remains lopsided, based on mutual cooperation rather than market rules.
Nick Thomas-Symonds, the cabinet minister in charge of reset, claims to see "no appetite" for rejoining the EU. Heaven knows where he is looking. He and his Commission counterpart Maros Sefcovic will plug away at their thin agenda on the margins of the 2020 Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The UK will seek to minimise its budgetary contributions, reduce the volume of student exchanges and disguise the scale of political concessions made to Brussels.
