Roderick Kefferpuetz / May 2026
Photo: Shutterstock
For decades, the European Union built its prosperity on a quiet assumption: that others would take care of the hard parts.
The United States provided security. Russia supplied cheap energy. China delivered growth. It was a comfortable triangle wrapped in a rules-based world that seemed, if not permanent, then at least predictable.
But that world is gone.
Russia has weaponised energy and redrawn borders by force. China is no longer just a partner for growth but a systemic rival reshaping markets and rules to its advantage. And under Trump the United States has become a questionable security guarantor.
What is collapsing is not just a geopolitical order, but Europe’s entire operating model.
The EU needs to stand on its own two feet, and the problem is not a lack of power. On paper, the European Union is formidable. It’s the world’s largest single market, a major financial actor, and, put together, a serious military force. Many countries around the world are looking for partnerships with the EU. And many are lining up to join.
The EU’s weakness, however, lies in its ability to act.
The EU was designed for consensus, compromise and inclusion. That is its historic strength. But in a world of rapid geopolitical competition, it has become a structural constraint. Too often, action is blocked by those unwilling to move.
This is the EU’s paradox: It has pooled sovereignty to increase power but struggles to use that power.
If it wants to remain capable of acting in this volatile new world, it must no longer wait for perfect unity and consensus, but coalitions of the willing.
In fact, European integration has never been a purely consensual process. Schengen began outside the EU framework. The euro was adopted by a subset of member states. Progress has often come from groups of countries moving ahead and others joining later. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly foresees the possibility of enhanced cooperation.
Today, this logic is returning, not as an exception, but as a necessity. And across key areas, such coalitions of the willing are already emerging.
In defence, the E5 Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and (non-EU) United Kingdom are deepening cooperation on procurement, training and capability development.
In finance, the E6 Finance Ministers of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain are pushing forward the European Savings and Investment Union, to deepen European capital markets and mobilise Europe’s vast private savings.
Coalitions of the willing allow Europe to move where unanimity fails. They create momentum, demonstrate feasibility, and keep the door open for others, particularly relevant non-EU actors such as the United Kingdom, to join.
The benchmark becomes effective action, not perfect agreement. A Europe that insists on moving only together risks not moving at all. And in today’s world, inaction is not affordable. The EU’s strength has never been complete uniformity. It has been its ability to turn diversity into common action.
As Mario Draghi has put it, the EU needs a form of “pragmatic federalism”. “Pragmatic, because we must take the steps that are currently possible, with the partners who are currently willing, in the domains where progress can currently be made.”
But this shift will not happen on its own. It requires political leadership. And here, Germany is pivotal. For too long, Berlin has been hesitant to embrace flexible coalitions, fearing division or the weakening of EU institutions. That caution is now becoming a strategic liability.
Germany is absent from key formats that are shaping Europe’s future: it has stayed out of initiatives such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Three Seas Initiative, the European Crisis Preparedness Coalition. It has also been reluctant to engage in new ideas such as a European Defence Bank, despite partners such as Finland, the UK and the Netherlands, actively pushing Berlin on it.
Individually, each of these decisions may be defensible. Taken together, they reveal a pattern: Germany is too often on the sidelines when coalitions form.
So far, Friedrich Merz has not broken with this pattern. His approach to Europe remains largely bilateral and reactive, focused on individual relationships rather than building durable coalitions. But in today’s Europe, leadership is not about standing next to others. It is about bringing them together.
