David Henig / Jun 2026
Photo: Shutterstock
Ten years on, and what did you learn, as my twice-refugee Grandfather used to ask late in his life and early in mine. Well, there’s been little space for reflection, between the endless repetition of UK politicians stuck in 2016 either as their highlight or preventable nightmare, and an EU doing what comes naturally, seeking internal consensus and presenting that in a negotiation. Neither side really understands why the other behaves as they do even after all this time.
Hence those few of us still shuttling between London and Brussels get frustrated not least as simplistic statements that pass for wisdom continue to dominate particularly the UK media. No, the EU hasn’t changed fundamentally, and negotiations are still more about finding joint solutions than yelling at each other.
What we therefore really want people to understand is the following:
This is a Permanent Negotiation
Neighbours matter particularly to trading nations in an inter-connected global economy. That might be for supply chains, energy transmission, rights to cross borders for work, migration flows, tracking criminals, cabotage, and much more besides.
Look at the map and it is obvious that the UK and EU must be in permanent talks, although from a slightly different angle. For the UK, the EU is the key neighbour, whereas for the EU it is one of quite a few each with their own peculiarities.
For the UK it is therefore overdue that the political system invests in the EU relationship as much as if it were members. That could for example mean an EU specialist in Number 10 as has not been the case since 2019. A dedicated committee of the Commons is logical. Notwithstanding the last rather unfortunate example, consider a political appointee as Ambassador, and certainly employ many more people in Brussels generally. Stopping thinking of individual discrete negotiations and start treating this as an ongoing process. Finding a stable political process to set objectives and monitor implementation would be good.
Not doing any of this consistently demonstrated a dilettante attitude to Brexit that almost certainly condemned it to failure. Michel Barnier incidentally was very good at being a frontman for the EU side, and as a Frenchman understood the forces around Brexit in a way that wasn’t generally seen for example from mainstream Germans, who mostly shook their heads in the belief the UK had simply gone mad. At least the EU still has a dedicated UK working group of members, even if as a general weakness it struggles to bring together trade and security issues, which negatively affects UK relations.
Deals may be Quick but Real Agreement Takes Years
Two volumes of UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement above my desk demonstrate how lengthy trade rules can be. Yet their content is always just a framework, for the two sides to then implement according to their view of what was agreed.
Hence even on topics apparently agreed, the issues are never really closed. Perhaps inspired by a pugilistic media or a belief that’s just Euro-nonsense, UK politics has never really understood this, and its negotiators too nervous of politicians in a hurry to tell them. There has always as a result been a rush to suggest sharp deadlines for text to be agreed.
This has not worked. The UK government has continually complained about the way arrangements relating to Northern Ireland are interpreted by the Commission. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement clearly does not provide sufficient support for UK exporters. There is every sign the same could happen on food and drink trade and linkage of Emissions Trading Schemes.
Time can also be a friend to negotiators in providing the space to test new approaches or reach better agreements. Changes in personnel reveal new possibilities, as 2024 demonstrated. A constructive UK government has shown the current realities of what the EU can offer, but both will evolve over time.
In this sense only, those who say Brexit hasn’t yet been done actually have a point. Discussions are and always will be ongoing.
Advantage EU in Negotiations
For this one I am indebted to fellow trade wonk and Eurostar habitué Sam Lowe who suggested that the EU achieves 90% of what it wants with the UK probably around the time when the two of us were alone in predicting that arrangements regarding Rules of Origin for Electric Vehicles would be extended. He in particular was getting irate at being told this wouldn’t happen by London-based folk whose engagement with Brussels was rather less frequent.
There is a limit though, since the EU also wants some sense of order. Brussels never really wanted to offer Theresa May a Customs Union but legendary EU fixer Martin Selmayr felt it at the time necessary to resolve Northern Ireland problems. Fortunately for them Boris Johnson then caved into allowing an Irish sea border after all.
There are details in finalised text that were UK asks, though far more which came originally from the EU. In particular if it is something important to them like youth mobility or level playing field provisions, then the UK has to accept that Brussels will have its way.
Understanding EU negotiating lines means talking to a range of people specifically in Brussels to hear the different opinions and analyse how they are likely to coalesce. This process makes positions hard to unpick once set. By contrast a UK position could be set at whim one day, probably for media attention, and abandoned the next. Even if there is mandate, its secrecy means it can easily be reversed.
There is another reason for the EU approach, which is to balance relations with various third countries including neighbours. This is what leads to a reality of no special deals for the UK.
Some Barriers are Bigger than Others
Most impact assessments of the UK leaving the EU were wrong. Specifically, they over-estimated the negative impact on services and under-estimated that on goods. There are two likely reasons of which the first is simple comparative advantage, the UK is valued internationally for services rather than goods.
More significantly though is that services barriers are of a completely different order than that of goods. For the latter means physical barriers and delays, whereas the former can often be overcome with corporate structuring or finding people with the right passports. Given also the amount of trade that takes place in supply chains where resilience is crucial, a legal change may be expensive but is then done, where continual uncertainty over consignments is a recurring problem.
Trade policy doesn’t particularly understand services, which have grown without any serious international rules notwithstanding the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Governments talk about Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualification as something that can be done, though these have no known economic value. In reality major policy steps such as meeting rules for data transfer are primarily domestic in execution, even if they are also part of the endless negotiation.
That said, for individuals in the modern economy, mobility commitments can make a real difference to their livelihoods. They need open trade rules that large companies can work round. This is something the EU could be far more flexible about. Just don’t expect to see the impact in the trade in services statistics that reflect the large capital flows of major multinationals rather more.
Good will is crucial and has been under-estimated by both sides
UK politicians seem convinced that artificial intelligence regulation could finally provide the Brexit regulatory dividend, even if they don’t know how. Yet every sign from the last ten years suggests such a thing does not exist at least in a way that would overcome trade barriers. Moreover, even to suggest such a thing automatically places the EU on the defensive that the UK just wants to cherry pick.
Which is even worse for the fact that the UK is really not a particularly good regulator, prone to closed systems in which new thinking is unwelcome and last-minute rushes common. By contrast the EU model of consensus may appear inflexible but delivers a relatively broad foundation.
Of course, the EU is not infallible in negotiations either, prone to a rather overbearing or demanding attitude that similarly does not always suggest much time for its counterpart. That is part of a general confidence that can easily seep into arrogance that is being sorely tested by now being the smaller player to two superpowers.
Given this is a permanent negotiation, one of the world’s largest trade relationships, and essential to continental security, both sides could be doing rather more to demonstrate respect that may build trust. Avoiding such obvious traps is one way to achieve this.
Such perhaps is life, emotions and politics that this hasn’t yet happened, but as my grandfather also said often, “we have to learn to live together”. Geography determines that much more than anything else, and something in which a lot more progress is still needed. Regardless of the ultimately agreed relationship model.
