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Everything Brussels really thinks about the UK

David Henig / Dec 2025

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Mostly, the Brussels bubble does not consider the UK too much. That rather amorphous group of those working in and around the institutions whether for government or other organisations, that meets over coffee, at lunch, and receptions, has rather a lot else on its mind. There are many higher priorities on which to seek the classic consensus / fudge, including US and China relations, competitiveness, enlargement, budget, and the future of its industry.

Responding to the Russian threat to Ukraine and neighbouring states is an obvious and important high-priority exception where the UK is seen to have responded well. Such a contribution to the common good has opened some doors, but does not fundamentally change any realities. This was seen in the failure to agree the terms for UK involvement in the SAFE project by the end of November, illustrating a marked failure by both sides to work as partners.

Even where the EU has some responsibility to care about the UK, with regard to Northern Ireland, there is neglect. Commission plans to implement the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the end of de minimis exemption for small packages, and reduced steel quotas will all have an effect sometimes recognised but rarely acknowledged by over-stretched and rather stressed trade officials nervous about existing orders breaking down.

Ask specifically about the UK and there is a mix of regret, bitterness, suspicion and recrimination, about Brexit as breach of solidarity, bad conduct during the exit process, and what is seen as London’s entitled assumption that none of this should affect trade ties. Worse, media briefings seen by UK politicians as domestic sport were and still are often seen in Brussels as direct insults, and a handful of apologies from Labour Ministers have only slightly repaired this damage.

Though equally there is a desire in Brussels for better relations. This is mostly a vague ideal with the size of the trade relationship rarely mentioned, more that plenty of people enjoyed working with the Brits and hope to see this happen again. There are also those who hope to prove Brexit a mistake. This then is not to mistake warm feelings for softness in negotiations, not least when pride in a traditionally successful machinery for dealing with third countries has been dented by the US.

For a few individuals any UK return to the EU is seen in terms of political balance, in that the country was traditionally a centrist balance on many issues, which might help the battle against populists. Then again the prospect of a future Nigel Farage government in the UK works against this not least given the memories of his disruptions as a Member of the European Parliament. Whether this latter threat helps or hinders current trade talks is as yet unclear.

That Brussels still reads the UK media being as it is in English and the politics is often entertaining is a problem. Deliberate government leaks as part of the domestic debate is a particular issue when not balanced by public messaging in the EU capital. Or as one waspish individual said, “I like the invites to UK hosted parties even when I have no idea what they actually want.”

There is wider exasperation that the UK political system doesn’t really understand Brussels, possibly never did, and under-estimates the problems that then arise in negotiations. EU officials often like conversations with their UK counterparts, who are considered open and intelligent, and largely naïve in negotiating. More than a few are therefore also baffled as to why there isn’t greater expertise.

Brussels does want the current talks based on the common understanding to be successful. There is some internal denial in the EU and UK as to how biased the package is in favour of the larger player, but such is the relationship. The UK is allowed a few token wins while the EU will have the SPS alignment it always wanted, the return to Erasmus that is of personal interest to many senior individuals with teenagers, and a strengthening of European energy markets. In order to hide this there will be briefings about how the UK is behaving badly and widely hated by Member States which aren’t in fact true but disguise the reality while also helping stave off some Whitehall complacency.

Labour’s red lines of no return to Customs Union and Single Market are considered rather less important than EU principles. Which is to say that if a future UK government wanted to erase theirs, then it would need to tackle the three underlying Brussels realities for neighbours, that greater access means accepting close to free movement of people, financial contribution, and regulatory alignment. There is still no option in which most goods move more freely than people or money.

Not that Brussels is averse to its own cherry picking with regard to the single market, or completely consistent if for example it doesn’t really want to offer free movement alongside a Customs Union with Turkey. Such flexibility is only considered available to the EU rather than smaller neighbours who must take what is offered in line with rough principles. Whether that survives a new age of trade policy uncertainty does remain to be seen, but probably even in a time which cries out for genuine partnerships.

At the extremes of future Brussels thought are that enlargement in particular with regard to Ukraine can’t be delayed forever, and that some sort of hybrid version with access to the single market could also help the UK in the future. Then again, this could all become moot should the potentially catastrophic event to the EU of a far-right French President from 2027 come to pass.

Ultimately though Brussels tends to talk of big changes which only become realistic when all other options are exhausted, and there are even doubts as to whether this any longer applies. Really, not much radical change is expected in UK relations for the foreseeable future, the limitation being both this and the UK’s own politics. Any leader who wants to change this will have to work hard in Brussels to do so, including in finding partners who can make it happen.

David Henig

David Henig

December 2025

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