Europe’s security: don’t start with budgets

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After the last 18 months, no serious European leader can honestly say that Europe doesn’t need to rethink its approach to security. We are facing the Russian threat from the East, exacerbated by its invasion of Ukraine, the threat from the West by a US government seeking regime change in Europe (and elsewhere), and now additional threats to the South caused by the US/Israeli war on Iran and the Israeli war on the Palestinians.

The debate on what is needed is well underway, but it is almost entirely focused (thanks to Trump) on how much money Europeans spend on defence. This is putting the cart before the horse. The EU and the UK collectively already spend more than three times as much as Russia on defence. What we need is to agree on a strategic concept and then look at what may be needed to fund it. If Europe is now under threat from the US, it should not be spending large sums of money on US controlled and maintained jets, artillery and missile defence equipment, or agreeing, as Sweden has done, to give US armed forces full control of 17 military bases and training grounds across its territory. 

A new strategic concept should start from the assessment that Europe is trapped between hostile powers (US and Russia). The Russia threat is obvious even if it needs careful analysis. The US threat is more difficult for many European leaders to swallow because of the US’ historical role as a key defence ally and NATO hegemon. Europe now needs to understand that the current US administration is deeply hostile to the EU and that this is not a temporary aberration. Europe represents a soft power alliance of democracies and a legal system of rules and norms for the private sector. This is both politically abhorrent to an important part of the US polity and economically abhorrent to its dominant tech sector. As Palantir CEO Peter Thiel put it, rules are “the new anti Christ”.

The  global vision of the Trump administration, as laid out so clearly in December’s National Security Strategy, has many points of connection with that of Russia. Both want to return to a world of great power competition under which international law is replaced by the spheres of influence of two or three great powers, with the balance between them determined by their relative strength. As Ukraine is demonstrating, in this vision of the world, Europe becomes the battleground for deciding where the Russian sphere of influence ends and the US one begins. At times, it seems that the US sees Europe as entirely part of Russia’s sphere. Any European strategy must start from a rejection of becoming a dependent actor of either.   

Europe’s strategy should be about protecting territory, yes, but also about protecting democracy, human rights, international law and multilateralism as essential to our interests. These values are essential because Europe is a collection of middle powers bound by rules and values. Lose them and Europe will unravel, strengthen them and we will also strengthen our alliances with the overwhelming majority of the world’s countries who, like us, have no interest in a world dominated by superpowers. 

Our ability to protect ourselves should then be based on defensive security, deterring those who threaten us rather than being a junior partner of a global offensive power. This has major implications for the tools and weapons we need: guns, drones and bullets, but also diplomacy, trade, development aid, humanitarian action, and a commitment to International Law and the entirety of the multilateral system that is now at risk. Networks of preventive diplomacy and mediation also need to be strengthened to enable the much-needed back-channel negotiations and dialogue to help resolve conflicts such as Ukraine. We should be revisiting the important concepts developed during the Cold War, such as common security (as designed by the Palme Commission in the 1980s), civil non-military defence and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs),

In parallel, Europe should be investing in what are now urgent negotiations on arms control  for the new generations of nuclear, AI and other  high-tech weapons. It is high time also to push for the restart of nuclear disarmament negotiations after the lapse of existing Treaties. Today, there are 12,241 nuclear weapons, each with an explosive power thousands of times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

Once we know what we need, we can develop the structures to deliver it. These will most likely involve some kind of combination of EU, the European pillar of NATO and, possibly, a new structure that will facilitate the inclusion of non-EU participants. Some are talking about a European Security Council, others about reviving the Western European Union. Last but not least, Europe should be taking a hard look at the huge savings and efficiencies that could be achieved by bringing together its 27 national arms industries and procurement processes.

Only after this comprehensive analysis will Europe be even in a position to put a price tag on its future security. Without it, if we start from the budget, we will inadvertently make ourselves more security dependent by buying more US weapons. Worse, we will risk trying to pay for our security at the expense of the social and democratic model that we are seeking to protect. As Cicero put it: 'Ubi bene, ibi patria,' where I thrive, there is my homeland.