Apostolos Thomadakis / Feb 2026
Photo: Shutterstock
For years, Europe has treated the idea of strategic autonomy like a PR slogan. Something to repeat at conferences and summits. But it’s not branding. It’s about resilience. Real autonomy means being able to take hits and still stay the course. By that measure, the EU remains far too exposed.
The threats are no longer theoretical. Security guarantees that held for decades are under strain. Trade is being used as a weapon, not just a bargaining chip. Supply chains built around efficiency are being bent into tools of pressure. Europe is discovering, sometimes the hard way, that being a rich market doesn’t automatically make you powerful. It can also make you vulnerable.
The issue runs deep. The EU has real authority in a few areas – trade, competition rules, the single market, and for some, monetary policy. In those fields, it speaks clearly and gets results. But where it counts today – defence, tech, energy, and the intersection of trade and security – the EU still acts like a loose group of states. It holds meetings, seeks consensus, compromises endlessly. The result is often a watered-down version of action. In today’s world, that is not just inefficient. It is dangerous.
The takeaway is simple. Europe needs to match its ability to decide with the level of risk it faces. If others are turning economic ties into pressure points, the EU must be able to respond quickly and collectively. If it can't, its divisions will be used against it. That leads to a bad place; militarily dependent, politically weak, and slowly losing its industrial edge.
There’s another problem too. Decision-making isn’t only about voting rules. It’s also about delivery. Europe can write rules fast, but it struggles to execute at scale. Approvals take too long. Grid expansion is behind. Capital markets aren’t deep enough to support a serious industrial upgrade. A union that can regulate but not build will keep losing ground, regardless of how well it coordinates.
So what would “pragmatic federalism”, that Mario Dragji spoke about in his speech at the Catholic University of Leuven during his award of honorary doctorate, look like in practice? Not theory, but steps that change incentives and outcomes. Four stand out.
First, build a defence industry that goes beyond coordination. The problem isn’t only spending levels. It’s fragmentation. Twenty-seven procurement systems, mismatched standards and small production runs mean high costs and lower readiness. The fix is joint procurement with multi-year commitments, common requirements and a genuine European defence industrial plan focused on scale in critical segments. That also requires financing large enough to matter. Without shared money and shared demand, coordination alone won’t deliver.
Second, treat industrial policy as a sovereignty tool, not as a patchwork of national exceptions. Europe moves too slowly. Strategic projects get buried in red tape. Other powers move faster, take bigger risks and accept short-term costs to secure long-term advantage. Europe needs an engine that can finance and scale key sectors without constant fights between capitals. That includes a functioning Savings and Investments Union, faster permitting for strategic projects and state-aid rules that reward cross-border cooperation rather than national duplication.
Third, turn dependency into something manageable. Europe will not stop relying on the US for defence or on China for parts of key industrial ecosystems overnight. That’s not realistic. But the goal isn’t to cut ties completely. It’s to ensure those ties can’t be used against you. That means diversifying exposure and building capacity at home where it matters, including processing where feasible, recycling, substitution and a serious skills pipeline. It also means building real partnerships with other countries, backed by finance, infrastructure and credible demand. Otherwise, diversification remains a slogan.
Fourth, close the gap where trade meets security. Europe is unified on trade but split on defence and foreign policy. That split invites pressure. A tariff becomes a threat. A supply-chain disruption becomes political leverage. The solution isn’t to weaken the single market. It’s to strengthen its ability to defend itself. That means giving EU institutions clearer authority in external and security-linked economic decisions, moving beyond the reflex that every sensitive step requires unanimity, and building standing teams that can map vulnerabilities, anticipate coercion and act fast.
None of this will be easy, and not everyone will like it. But the cost of waiting is clear. Delay means more exposure, less room to manoeuvre and fewer options when the next shock hits.
Europe isn’t choosing between becoming a superstate and keeping national control. It’s choosing between being stuck and being able to act. It doesn’t need an empire to defend its values. But it does need the ability to decide, invest and build like one system when it matters. That’s the difference between sounding important and actually being strong.
