"Dear Ursula..."

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Andrew Duff imagines a letter from the British Prime Minister to the President of the European Commission.

 

Dear Ursula,

I am writing to prepare for a successful summit meeting between the European Union and the United Kingdom, scheduled for 19 May. You have, quite rightly, been asking for more clarity from the UK about what we envisage the 'reset' of our relationship to be about. The current turbulence in global affairs adds weight to the responsibility placed on both of us to reach mutual agreement on the way forward for our important strategic partnership.

Brexit

The UK seceded from the EU in January 2020 after 48 years of membership. Brexit left the EU smaller, poorer and weaker — to the evident delight of your rivals and competitors. The consequences of Brexit for the UK have been demonstrably bad: the British economy has shrunk by more than 5% and supply chains have been disrupted. As the diversity of the UK's trade has narrowed, choice for the British consumer has fallen. Travel has become more complicated for British citizens. Science and education have lost many international links. The country has struggled to fill the regulatory gap left by the departure of the Commission and its agencies. There are some critical labour shortages. Britain's reputation around the world for a certain stability and competence has taken a battering. Even those British who once supported Brexit now seem rather depressed by its unfulfilled promise.

Neither the Withdrawal Agreement of October 2019 nor the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) of December 2020 provides a solid or comprehensive basis for the future relationship. That is why my government, which came into office in July 2024, engaged on a policy to 'reset' the partnership on a sounder footing. This involves for the most part seeking to lower the non-tariff barriers to trade erected by Brexit. Several Brexit items remain outstanding — some unavoidable because of timetables set by the EU agenda: the data adequacy decision is up for renewal this summer; the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) comes into force next January; and the controversial chapters in the TCA on energy and fisheries expire in June 2026.

Numerous other pressing problems remain unresolved: the settlement for Gibraltar; the conclusion of an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) to protect human, animal and plant health; and a deal that will help Europe's young people to travel and study across the Channel. The UK would also seek improvements for the working conditions of musicians and artists. We hope that more can be achieved to facilitate trade in financial services. Science and industry would benefit from greater alignment in chemicals. The position of Northern Ireland, half-in and half-out of the EU's internal market, remains precarious in economic and constitutional terms. The challenge of irregular immigration has if anything been compounded, not resolved by Brexit.

Our summit meeting on 19 May will be able to assess progress made on addressing the problems and opportunities presented under the current treaty arrangements. No doubt we can sign some thin agreements on this or that. However, while the UK government remains willing to continue negotiations on all such items, it is clear that the exercise is proving to be complex, costly and time-consuming — for both parties.

Growth

Furthermore, even if the optimum possible is achieved under the present set-up, the sum total will not amount to what I believe is necessary to put the UK-EU relationship on an altogether more fruitful level. That the implementation of the TCA is up for review in 2026 does not mean that it is open for radical revision. London and Brussels are faced with the likelihood of many more months, even years, of difficult and protracted negotiations while the rest of the world moves on. The unconventional tariff policy of President Trump exacerbates the problems faced by British and EU traders.

The central purpose of my government is to grow the British economy. Amongst other things, it is now clear that economic growth requires the full restoration of the UK's relations with its largest trading partner, the EU. My government, therefore, in the light of all the circumstances, has now reached the decision to drop its so-called 'red lines' that denied a customs union and single market agreement with the Union.

We may recall how the UK helped to build the single market in the first place. We understand, and respect, the EU's position on maintaining a level playing field and a balance of rights obtained on accessing the single market with obligations pursuant to EU governance. This government recognises, as our predecessors did not, that the mutual recognition of industrial standards and professional qualifications must be based on rules-based dynamic alignment and not on ad hoc gentlemen’s agreements.

The UK shares with the EU the broad objectives of economic policy articulated by Mario Draghi in his recent report. Both of us are seeking to raise productivity by increasing investment and improving training. We strongly support moves towards more integrated capital markets, especially to help start-ups and SMEs to access venture capital. UK participation in such financial policy developments would, of course, greatly expand European capital flows.

The Draghi Report also argues for the greater coordination of European economic policies. We agree. The UK and EU have a common interest in promoting free trade. This means lowering tariffs where possible and avoiding tariff wars. Both of us must collaborate with other members of G20 to build global alliances based on free trade. We support the EU in your efforts to conclude the Mercosur agreement. We hope that the EU might seek to join alongside us in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Defence

The other field where the UK and EU can and must strengthen collaboration, of course, is security and defence. As you know, the UK has not been backward in support of Ukraine's brave efforts to protect its territorial and constitutional integrity. We are providing armaments and training to the Ukraine military. We are sharing intelligence with President Zelensky's government. We are leading the Joint Expeditionary Force of the Nordic and Baltic states. We are working hard with President Macron to build a 'coalition of the willing' ready to support Ukraine as and when a ceasefire can take place. We endorse the 'steel porcupine' tactic for Ukraine's long-term security. We are using our best endeavours as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and through our links with the US administration in Washington to make the case for solidarity in the face of Russian aggression.

The British government remains committed to the concept of the Atlantic Alliance while fully acknowledging that NATO is now under great strain. It is important to maintain NATO's key military capabilities at the same time as we build Europe's strategic autonomy. Maybe a joint EU-NATO command could be established to manage affairs where the US does not wish to participate directly. To be truly effective, coalitions of the willing risk instability unless grounded in institutions with centripetal force. We hope the EU will focus on advancing permanent structured cooperation in defence among its politically willing and militarily capable member states.

Enlargement

The UK welcomes the new dynamism that the EU now attaches to enlargement. We wholly approve of the EU's expressed wish to accelerate Ukrainian membership. That is the best way to secure Ukraine's sovereignty, to rebuild its economy, and to develop its judicial and political system as an assured liberal democracy. We hope that Ukraine fast-tracked as a full member state will be a pathfinder for Moldova as well as for those Western Balkan countries which truly desire European integration. We also note with great interest a revival of the debate within Norway and Iceland about upgrading their membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) into full EU accession.

There has often been speculation that a 'Norway solution' will be suitable for the UK as it searches for a new modus operandi with the EU. That is not my view. European integration has now advanced so far from where it was when the EEA was first invented that the whole complex of Europe's interdependency must be put on a more robust and democratic footing. With defence becoming a fresh driver of integration, the relationship will become even deeper. Because every passing year since Brexit will widen the divergence between the UK and the EU, the full refurbishment of the relationship cannot be put off.

The British government has therefore now decided to apply for full membership of the European Union. This decision is not taken lightly, nor for narrow economic reasons. UK membership of the EU will enhance the Union's geopolitical clout in world affairs at this critical moment when a revanchist Russia has returned to war, the Middle East is in turmoil, China raises formidable challenges — and the traditional transatlantic alliance that united the West is no more. Putting recent difficulties firmly behind us, the search for ever closer European unity is the shared destiny of the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Objectives

The EU that Britain is seeking to join is rather different from the one it voted to leave in 2016. We have already spoken of the new defence dimension. The Union has also taken on substantial new competences in the field of public health and in shaping recovery from the pandemic via Next Generation EU. The EU has begun to legislate for the digital age. It leads the way towards Net Zero. With its new round of enlargement, the Union assumes greater responsibilities for its whole neighbourhood.

Well aware of the UK's past reputation as a eurosceptic member state, the EU institutions and its national capitals need to know what kind of member the UK will be henceforward. Britain will immediately be in the vanguard of defence policy under the provisions of Article 42(6) TEU. We will also join the arrangements of enhanced cooperation in the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Article 83(3) TFEU), the European public prosecutor's office (Article 86(1) TFEU), and Europol (Article 87(3) TFEU). The UK will join the drive against over-regulation, especially with regard to data protection, artificial intelligence and the digital market.

The UK will subscribe to the goals of economic and monetary union as a member state 'with a derogation' (Article 139 TFEU). Although sterling may join the euro at some future stage, among the conditions to be met would be that EMU had been consolidated by a genuine banking union and that the European Central Bank had assumed the role of bank of last resort. The UK will support the launch of a genuine joint debt instrument that gives the EU more fiscal headroom, under the management of an EU treasury secretary in the Commission.

As to the imminent revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the UK would be looking to grow the EU budget to about 3% of EU GDP, aimed mainly at productive investment in European public goods. We will support the addition of new sources of supranational revenue, relieving the burden of higher expenditure falling on national treasuries by way of GNI contributions. The UK will immediately subscribe to the European Investment Bank, restoring its formerly significant contribution to infrastructure and industrial investment in Britain. UK priorities in the single market are to deepen integration in services and to sort out the dysfunctional electricity market, bolstered by energy supply from the North Sea. UK science would once again be an active participant in EU R&D programmes. We will work with our EU partners in reinforcing the combat against climate change and in developing workable and humane policies on irregular immigration.

Reform

In view of its decision to fast-track Ukraine's membership, the EU will have to act strictly in conformity with Article 49 TEU and restrict the use of unanimity decisions among the EU 27 member states to the beginning and end of the accession process. The UK expects that good practice also to be deployed in the case of its own membership bid. Our goal is to have the enlargement ratified in time for both Ukrainian and British electors to play a full part in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2029.

The UK has no interest in joining a Union that is not working well. British ministers, officials, judges and parliamentarians will be ready to resume their active engagement in the work of the EU institutions and in improving governance.

Conscious of the need to reform the workings of the EU, the UK, once a member state, intends to propose re-opening the treaties to make two amendments. The first proposal will be to change from unanimity to QMV the deployment of the general passerelle clause (Article 48(7) TEU). This would make the way the Union is governed more efficient and democratic. The second, related amendment will be to suppress Article 335 TFEU. This would extend the scope of the passerelle to: (1) the matter of own resources and MFF (Articles 311 & 312 TFEU); (2) the capacity of the Union to act effectively — the 'flexibility clause' (Article 352 TFEU); and (3) the punishment of member states found to be in serious and persistent breach of the values of the Union (Article 7(2) TEU).

Process

This letter will be annexed to a white paper that will shortly be tabled in the Houses of Parliament. On a vote to approve the white paper, the government will give formal notice to the Council of the EU of its candidacy for membership under the terms of Article 49. At the end of the accession negotiations, once the details of the terms and conditions of membership are known, there will be another referendum in the UK. The public will not be asked to vote speculatively as it was in 2016, but in full knowledge of where Britain lies in the future of Europe.

The EU may raise concerns about the apparently fickle nature of British politics on Europe. At present, there is a strong 'pro-European' majority in the House of Commons, where the smaller centrist parties — Liberal Democrats, Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, Greens and others — already criticise a perceived lack of European commitment by my government. The House of Lords will be broadly supportive of this initiative. The devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland seem also inclined to favour a new membership bid.

In the country at large, opinion polls suggest that there is widespread regret about Brexit and a willingness to draw closer once again to the EU. Many of the older people who voted to Leave in 2016 are now no longer able to do so. Many of the younger people who have joined the electoral roll since 2016 seem enthusiastic about the opportunities afforded by EU citizenship, especially freedom of movement. I am confident that when the argument is put that Britain should once again play a full part in European affairs, the answer will be positive.

I hope this letter will avoid too many surprises being sprung at our forthcoming summit meeting.

Yours most sincerely,

Keir Starmer