Riccardo Perissich / Jun 2026
Image: Shutterstock
This week marked both the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum and the resignation of the sixth British Prime Minister since that date. Many observers speak of a Britain that has become “Italian,” or at least of a Brexit that has paradoxically made the country more “European.” There is some truth in that. Those who, like the author of these lines, lived through the years of British participation in the European institutions remember a country that was difficult, often obstructionist, but always predictable and transparent, regardless of which party was in power. This contrasted with the less predictable and often more confused way political decisions were made in many other member states, including Germany and, of course, Italy. Today, by contrast, only a very brave person would attempt to predict with any degree of certainty the broad outlines of British domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead. Brexit has certainly played a role in this rather discouraging development, but the deeper reason lies in the difficult transition that all liberal democracies are undergoing. Each country must try to cure this ailment at home. The collective problem that concerns all Europeans is how to remedy the consequences of a difficult divorce that has harmed everyone.
The first phase consisted of negotiations over the terms of Brexit, which lasted nearly five years. It is difficult to recall a more asymmetrical confrontation. In Britain, the referendum had been won on the basis of falsehoods and an appeal to emotions, which in reality amounted to a collective protest against the ruling elites. This phenomenon foreshadowed the one that would later bring Trump and the MAGA movement to power. As a result, the referendum’s victors arrived at the negotiating table without any concrete strategy regarding the objectives they wished to achieve. The only possible guiding principle was to proclaim the restoration of full sovereignty as an inviolable limit: “Brexit means Brexit.”
The strategy of the 27 member states was quite different. Aware of the objective imbalance of power in their favor, the Europeans were primarily motivated by the desire to avoid contagion at all costs. To that end, no concessions could be made to the demands of the condemned traitor. No compromise could undermine the sacred nature of the European rules from which Britain had chosen to exempt itself. The final result was a complete victory for the position of the 27, but above all for the strategic objective that the European institutions had set themselves. Any desire for imitation disappeared: the dreams of “Frexit” or “Italexit” came to an end. Even the most fervent sovereigntists adopted the policy of “changing Europe from within.” Nor was that all. None of the countries traditionally close to British positions, such as the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, or certain Eastern European states, made any attempt to soften the uncompromising negotiating stance adopted in Brussels.
Meanwhile, the world changed for everyone. It changed visibly for Britain, which quickly discovered that none of the promises of Brexit had any serious foundation and that the effects of the divorce translated into a noticeable loss of growth and prosperity. Given the imbalance of power involved, it was natural that the negative consequences of Brexit would appear sooner and more forcefully in Britain. It is therefore not surprising that the country engaged in a period of soul-searching over its mistake, to the point that many opinion polls now question the validity of the referendum result itself. The behavior of the other Europeans was different. The negotiations had proven us right, the traitor had been punished, no one wished to imitate him any longer; we could therefore leave him to fend for himself and turn our attention elsewhere.
In reality, there was no shortage of challenges to confront: the difficult climate transition, the growing loss of competitiveness and innovative capacity relative to the United States and China, and above all the profound transformation of global balances, marked by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the gradual disengagement of the United States from Europe, made even more evident by Trump’s hostile attitude. All these challenges require us to rethink the nature and functioning of the European Union. Yet we have discovered that they affect Britain in very similar ways and that, in some respects, it would be difficult to meet them without a solid relationship with London.
One need only consider a few examples. Helping Ukraine defend its sovereignty and strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy in defense—the so-called “European pillar of NATO”—would become far more difficult without the participation of the United Kingdom. Likewise, meeting the competitiveness challenge, which lies at the heart of discussions led by Draghi and Letta, requires close cooperation with the country that hosts some of the most dynamic innovation hubs on the continent. Finally, everyone agrees that a modern and efficient capital market must form an essential part of the European response. And while Brexit has led to some transfer of activity from London to certain European financial centers, the City remains by far the most liquid, dynamic, and efficient financial market available to Europeans. A vast field of common interests is therefore emerging. These convergences have also been reinforced by certain aspects of developments in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
Awareness of a mutual interest in opening a new phase in relations has therefore gradually strengthened on both sides of the Channel. This prospect became more concrete with the end of the last Conservative government in Britain. The question is how to proceed, and the difficulty is reflected in the limited progress achieved since the Labour government came to power. The reason is that both negotiators, despite their goodwill, remain trapped by the “red lines” drawn after the referendum.
On the British side, the obstacle is obvious: the categorical refusal to accept any return, even partial, to the jurisdiction of Brussels’ rules. The European position is more complex. Since the referendum campaign was won in the name of the sacred nature of those rules, it is now considered impossible to make concessions on that point. At most, one can imagine for Britain a situation similar to that of Norway or Switzerland, which implies automatic alignment with standards decided in Brussels. This inflexibility is also fueled by a certain desire for revenge. According to some—many among the Gaullists in France, but not only them—Britain should pay not only for Brexit but also for the obstruction it exercised during the long years of its participation in the common project. In essence, it should make its pilgrimage to Canossa.
This attitude has some justification, but it is greatly exaggerated. A more lucid look at the past shows that in many areas—from international trade to the construction of the integrated market—the United Kingdom’s contribution was highly positive. Moreover, this alleged obstructionism is sometimes invoked as a pretext to conceal difficulties that stem from other causes, particularly the fragility of Europeans’ common political will. Whenever we genuinely wanted to move forward, we overcame this obstacle: in the introduction of majority voting for issues relating to the single market, the euro, and Schengen—decisions that were implemented despite British opposition.
The problem is that Britain is neither Norway nor Switzerland, and it is difficult to break the deadlock without also questioning the European “red lines.” It is no coincidence that the area where the best results have been achieved is defense and security—fields that are not governed by EU rules. Some attribute the slow pace of progress to a lack of ambition: relying on polls that indicate a profound shift in British public opinion, they argue that we should explicitly raise the question of rejoining the EU. That would be a serious mistake that could have very negative consequences for everyone. If the principal motivation behind Brexit was a matter of identity, nothing happening today suggests that this issue has been resolved. The mistake that must not be repeated is the one that led to the defeat of those who campaigned to remain in the EU by arguing that “leaving would be worse.” Moreover, the European Union itself, confronted with new existential challenges, is undergoing an identity crisis. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible to accept Britain’s return to the EU on the same terms as before Brexit, for example regarding the euro.
The way forward is to address pragmatically the most urgent issues of common interest: defense, security, relations with the United States, innovation—including artificial intelligence—and finance; all areas that are decisive for a qualitative leap forward for Europe. To achieve this, both sides will need to soften their red lines. On the European side, without imposing constraints on the respective sovereignties involved, this should translate into a willingness to discuss new rules with Britain before they are definitively adopted. Grounding convergence in concrete interests would also help orient the new relationship between Europe and the United Kingdom toward building the future rather than managing the problems of the past.
Of course, no one can predict what Britain’s future political balance will look like, nor what priorities the likely next Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, may pursue in the coming months. Nevertheless, common sense suggests that there is still enough time to make progress that, once achieved, would be difficult to undo. In any case, it is worth trying.
A French version of this article can be found on the Telos website.
