Philip Ward and Jean-Marc Lieberherr / Feb 2026
Image: Shutterstock
Jean Monnet is mostly remembered as a founding father of the European Union. His strategy in both world wars is equally important.
In 1916-1917, Monnet was instrumental in setting up the Wheat Executive to procure bread supplies for the United Kingdom, France and Italy, as well as the Allied Maritime Supply Council which provided shipping for the transport of commodities and United States troops to Europe. In 1940-1942, Monnet supported President Franklin Roosevelt’s call to create ‘the great arsenal of democracy’ (a Monnet phrase) through the Victory Program. John Maynard Keynes rated Monnet’s contribution to US aircraft production so highly he thought it might have shortened the war by a year.
Monnet’s approach was to create a balance sheet of needs and resources, a statement of what was required to meet the common objective. The balance sheet then became a tool for joint action to meet those needs. This experience is highly relevant to today’s European defence requirements.
Recent threats present Mark Carney’s ‘middle powers’ with the need to band together.1 The time has come for a new initiative. The crucial field is once again rearmament, with Russian aggression and US unreliability demanding urgent action. Specifically, this note proposes that a coalition of willing partners set up a fully-integrated military supply executive, a European Defence Procurement Agency.
The EDPA would be run in the collective interest of its members, efficiency and mutual benefit the decision-making criteria. It would prepare a balance sheet of its constituents’ needs and resources in order to secure all military supplies needed for their defence by 2030.2 Its initial priorities would be accelerated tender processes and immediate shortcomings (eg artillery and drone deficiencies). The EDPA would also address longer-term requirements, such as advanced weapons systems and missile defences.
The EDPA would develop a comprehensive procurement framework and open-bid policy, supply contracts being awarded on merit (financial, strategic and technical). Spending better by spending together would satisfy Europe’s two strategic priorities—improving its security and developing its manufacturing capability—when substantial investments are required, notably in the fields of cyber-security and digital technology.
Building on existing arrangements—the European Defence Agency, the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation, its Security of Supply Board, NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package for the Ukraine and the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-Operation—the aim of this proposal is to achieve full procurement integration in one body with delegated powers to pool demand.3 To ensure appropriate authority, officials in charge would be appointed for a fixed period on similar terms to those at independent central banks.
Membership would be open to all European liberal democracies. Every participant could leave at any time and would retain control rights over deployment. This flexibility would give neutral states the option to join. Allowing more parties into the EDPA would create a virtuous cluster effect and help repair the European defence industry’s weaknesses, namely under-investment and fragmentation.
Members would cut costs by avoiding duplication. They should also benefit from scale economies and common standards: the former would encourage contractors to expand manufacturing capacities; the latter would enhance inter-operability, mobility and resilience, progressively solving problems of equipment disparity.
The EDPA would complement the EU’s European Defence Investment Plan and Security Action for Europe loan instrument. Eligible contractors fulfilling EDPA orders could seek EDIP and SAFE funding, as well as receiving payment from individual EDPA participants. Over time, the EDPA would provide Europe with autonomous logistical capacity and infrastructure.4 It would also ensure the availability of resources specifically tailored to Europe’s defence needs and encourage the co-development of next-generation equipment. This approach would maximise value for money, reducing the need for higher taxes or cuts in other areas of public spending, while favouring technological innovation, as well as the growth of competitive defence and aerospace platforms. Extra investment would also boost demand, growth and job creation.
The EDPA puts participants on an equal footing and precludes any accusations of cherry- picking. Focusing initially on the demand side allows for speedy implementation and the potential involvement of non-European democracies (eg Canada, Japan or South Korea). Further, the EDPA builds on bilateral cooperation agreements (such as the UK’s 2010 Lancaster House treaties with France or its 2024 Trinity House agreement with Germany) and provides a platform for a deeper security relationship in the future.
Monnet’s Memoirs stated ‘that it would take four months to draw up an accurate balance- sheet, two months to prepare a programme, and a further eighteen months for supplies to come off the production line’. This is a lesson for today. Time is short and Europe has none to waste.
1 Carney, Canadian prime minister, World Economic Forum speech, Davos (20 January 2026).
2 According to Bruno Kahl, the head of the German intelligence service, would probably be capable of attacking NATO ‘by the end of the decade’, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik speech, Berlin (27 November 2024).
3 The EDPA would have a wider remit than EU defence instruments such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production in which a third country such as the UK does not participate.
4 Including command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
